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The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers:  
Legal Risks of Blockchain  
 
Dirk A. Zetzsche,* Ross P. Buckley** and Douglas W. Arner*** 
 
Abstract 
The transformative potential of distributed ledger technology, especially in the 
financial sector, is attracting enormous interest. Many financial institutions are 
investing heavily in proof of concept demonstrations and the rollout of pilot 
applications of DLT technology. Part of the attraction of distributed ledger systems, 
such as Blockchain, lies in transcending law and regulation. From a technological 
perspective, DLT is generally seen as offering unbreakable security, immutability and 
unparalleled transparency, so law and regulation are seen as unnecessary. Yet while 
the law may be dull and the technology exciting, the impact of the law cannot be 
simply wished away. With data distributed among many ledgers, legal risk will 
remain. DLT projects may well be found, by courts, to constitute joint ventures with 
liability spread across all owners and operators of systems serving as distributed 
ledgers. Regulators seeking to support appropriate approaches to twenty-first century 
financial infrastructure must focus on these legal consequences. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past several years, interest in distributed ledger technology (DLT) such as 
blockchain has exploded.1 Regulators,2 consultants,3 technology firms4 and 
academia5 are promoting DLT for financial services. Blockchain technology has 
                                                 
1 Focusing on legal and governance issues only: Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain 
Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 THE CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 232 (2016); Carla L. 
Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology 
Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191 (2016); Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O'Brolcháin & 
Paul Haynes, Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134 
(2016); Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulation Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L. J. 
569 (2015-16); Lewis Rinaudo Cohen & David Contreiras Tyler, Blockchain's Three Capital Markets 
Innovations Explained, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (2016), available at 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3563116/Blockchains-three-capital-markets-innovations-explained.html; 
from the French literature: Primavera De Filippi & Michel Reymon, La Blockchain: comment réguler 
sans autorité, 83 et seq, in Nitot, T. (dir.) & Cercy N., Numérique: reprendre le contrôle, FRAMABOOK 
(2016); Pierre-Marie Lore, blockchain: évolution ou révolution pour les contrats en France ?, MBA 
THESIS INST. LÉONARD DE VINCI (2016), available at http://www.ilv.fr/les-blockchains-sont-elles-des-
technologies-adaptees-pour-gerer-les-contrats/ (analyzing vulnerabilities from a contractual 
perspective); André Ribeiro, La Blockchain et ses potentielles applications (2016) (unpublished B.A. 
thesis) 40, available at  http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:89544. 
2 IOSCO, RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) ch. 5 (February 2017), available 
at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf; ESMA, REPORT - THE DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO SECURITIES MARKETS (Feb. 7, 2017); Press Release, ASIC, Op-ed: 
Blockchain, (Oct. 26, 2015) available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/asic-responds/op-ed-
blockchain/. 
3 It has been estimated that “distributed ledger technology could reduce banks' infrastructure costs 
attributable to cross-border payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by between $15-20 
billion per annum by 2022": see Santander InnoVentures, OLIVER WYMAN AND ANTHEMIS GROUP, THE 
FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES (June, 2015), available 
at http://santanderinnoventures.com/fintech2/; WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (WITH DELOITTE), THE 
FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - AN AMBITIOUS LOOK AT HOW BLOCKCHAIN CAN RESHAPE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES (2016), available at 
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financial_infrastructure.pdf. 
4 See IBM Blockchain, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/ (last visited July 10, 2017). 
5 Quinn DuPont & Bill Maurer, Ledgers and Law in the Blockchain, KING’S REV. June 23rd (2015), 
available at http://kingsreview.co.uk/articles/ledgers-and-law-in-the-blockchain/; Eva Micheler & Luke 
von der Heyde, Holding, Clearing and Settling Securities through Blockchain/Distributed Ledger 
Technology: Creating an Efficient System by Empowering Investors, 11 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 652 
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moved beyond cryptocurrencies,6 like Bitcoin,7 and its application is now being 
considered for all parts of the financial system. Capital raising,8 trading,9 clearing and 
                                                 
(2016); Philipp Paech, Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain: An Inevitable Choice between 
Liquidity and Legal Certainty?, 21 UNIF. L. REV. 612 (2016). 
6 See Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property Systems and Anarchy: How Trustless Transfer Technology 
Will Shape the Future of Property Exchange, 45 SW. L. REV. 351 (2015-16); V. Gerard Comizio, Virtual 
Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in the Emerging FinTech Ecosystem, 21 
N.C. BANKING INST. 131 (2017); Matthew P. Ponsford, A Comparative Analysis of Bitcoin and Other 
Decentralised Virtual Currencies: Legal Regulation in the People’s Republic of China, Canada, and the 
United States, 9 HONG KONG J. L. STUD. 29 (2015); from Spain: Mª Nieves Pacheco Jiménez, 
Criptodivisas: Del Bitcoin Al Mufg. El Potencial De La Technología Blockchain, REVISTA CESCO DE 
DERECHO DE CONSUMO 19, 6–15 (2016). 
7 See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement 
in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L. J. 139, 140-155 (2016); Primavera De Filippi, 
Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, 3 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2014); Joshua 
J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital 
Currency System, 73 L.A. L. REV. 1119 (2012–2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative 
Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & L. J. 159, 171 (2012); Nikolei M. Kaplanov, 
NerdyMoney: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012–2013); John O. McGinnis & Kyle W. Roche, Bitcoin: Order without Law 
in the Digital Age (Nw. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 17-06, March 7, 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133; EDWARD V. MURPHY, M. MAUREEN MURPHY & MICHAEL V. 
SEITZINGER, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES (Oct. 13, 2015), 
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf; Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital 
Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 377 (2013); Misha 
Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestions for the Future, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1127 (2015). 
Peter Twomey, Halting a Shift in the Paradigm: The Need for Bitcoin Regulation, 16 TRINITY C. L. REV. 
67 (2013); from Germany: Nico Kuhlmann, Bitcoins – Funktionsweise und rechtliche Einordnung der 
digitalen Währung, COMPUTER & RECHT 691 (2014); Benjamin Beck & Dominik König, Bitcoins als 
Gegenstand von sekundären Leistungspflichten, 215 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILITISCHE PRAXIS 655 (2015); 
DANIEL KERSCHER, BITCOIN – FUNKTIONSWEISE, CHANCEN UND RISIKEN DER DIGITALEN WÄHRUNG 120 
(2nd ed., 2013); GERALD SPINDLER AND MARTIN BILLE, RECHTSPROBLEME VON BITCOINS ALS 
VIRTUELLE WÄHRUNG 1357 (2014); FRANZISKA BOEHM   AND PAULINA PESCH, BITCOINS: RECHTLICHE 
HERAUSFORDERUNGEN EINER VIRTUELLEN WÄHRUNG – EINE ERSTE JURISTISCHE EINORDNUNG MMR 75 
(2014). 
8 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 83-91. 
9 See Benito Arruñada, Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver Impersonal Exchange, MINN. J. L. SCI.& TECH. 
(2017); DAVID SHRIER, ET. AL., BLOCKCHAIN & TRANSACTIONS, MARKET AND MARKETPLACES (2016), 
available at https://cdn.www.getsmarter.com/career-advice/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/mit_blockchain_transactions_report.pdf; Gareth William Peters & Guy R. 
Vishnia, Blockchain Architectures for Electronic Exchange Reporting Requirements: EMIR, Dodd 
Frank, MiFID I/II, MiFIR, REMIT, Reg NMS and T2S (2016), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832604. 
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settlement,10 global payments,11 deposits and lending,12 property and casualty claims 
processing (InsurTech),13 digital identity management and authentication,14 and 
RegTech solutions15 (such as automated compliance, administration and risk 
management, and anti-money laundering and client suitability checks)  have all been 
identified as significant potential DLT use cases, and as areas that will benefit from 
the advantages DLT offers. In many recent instances, use cases have now moved 
through the proof of concept stage to the pilot stage.   
At the same time, legal concerns are emerging. The discussion so far has focused on 
investment fraud,16 the classification of crypto-currencies as securities, derivatives, 
commodities, currency or other assets,17 systemic risk regulation and central bank 
                                                 
10 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 119-128; Micheler & Heyde, supra note 
5; Paech, supra note 5, at 612–639. 
BC-based company Ripple operates almost like an interbank clearing service. Ripple was fined by the 
US Department of Treasury for functioning as an unlicensed money transmitter. See Joseph B. Evans, 
Bitcoin, Money and Funds: the Application of the Unlicensed Money Transmitting Services Statute to 
Virtual Currency, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2016), available at 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/11/14/bitcoin-money-and-funds-the-application-of-the-
unlicensed-money-transmitting-services-statute-to-virtual-currency/. 
11 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 21, 39, 46-55; Harry Leinonen, 
Decentralised Blockchained and Centralised Real-Time Payment Ledgers: Development Trends and 
Basic Requirements, in TRANSFORMING PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 236-261 (Jakub Górka, ed., 
2016). 
12 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 65-82, 119-119 (exploring the potential 
of Bitcoin for syndicated loans and trade finance as well as asset rehypothetication). 
13 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 40, 56-64. 
14 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (WITH DELOITTE), A BLUEPRINT FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY – THE ROLE 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN BUILDING DIGITAL IDENTITY 60 (Aug., 2016), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf (stressing the need for a 
more secure digital identity system, relying on Bitcoin characteristics); World Economic Forum (with 
Deloitte), supra note 3, at 22; STEWART BOND, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME – DIGITAL IDENTITY 
ON BLOCKCHAIN (March 24, 2017), available at http://idcdocserv.com/lcUS42416017. See particularly 
on IBM’s ‘Identity Management with Blockchain’: IBM, supra note 4. 
15 See World Economic Forum (with Deloitte), supra note 3, at 92-109 (exploring the potential of Bitcoin 
automated compliance and proxy voting). On RegTech, generally, see Douglas W. Arner, Jànos N. 
Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2017). 
16 Derek A. Dion, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating 
Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 167 (2013); Kiviat, supra note 
1, 569. 
17 Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, 
Prediction Markets, and Gambling 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 155-205 (2014-15); Ed 
Howden, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain Future, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
742, 761-769 (2015); Reyes, supra note 1, at 213-222 (summarizing US academic approaches 
categorizing DLT); Philipp Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks, MODERN L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017); GARETH W. PETERS, EFSTATHIOS PANAYI & ARIANE CHAPELLE, TRENDS IN 
CRYPTO-CURRENCIES AND BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES: A MONETARY THEORY AND REGULATION 
PERSPECTIVE (2015), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1508.04364.pdf; Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond 
Bitcoin: Issues in Regulation Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L. J. 569 (2015-16); Matthew P. 
Ponsford, A Comparative Analysis of Bitcoin and Other Decentralised Virtual Currencies: Legal 
Regulation in the People’s Republic of China, Canada, and the United States, 9 HONG KONG J. LEGAL 
STUD. 29 (2015); McGinnis &Roche, supra note 7; Andrew Hinkes, The Law of The DAO, CoinDesk 
(May 19, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/the-law-of-the-dao/ (last visited June 16, 2017) (arguing that 
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functions18 as well as money laundering19 and taxation.20 We seek to add another, 
private law dimension which has received little attention.21  
In analysing legal and regulatory issues around DLT, the starting point is to identify 
the central characteristics of the technology and analyse this within existing legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In this foundational analysis, legal and regulatory issues must 
be considered in the specific context of individual use cases, proofs of concept and 
pilots. Of central importance is the potential of DLT as a trust solution.22 The trust 
enhancing function of multiple (‘distributed’) entities together providing 
authentication rather than one ‘centralized’ ledger is claimed to lead to (1) 
disintermediation of traditional intermediaries and clearing and settlement systems 
(resulting in greater security and transparency), (2) enhanced efficiency and speed, (3) 
lower transaction costs, and (4) enhanced market access.  
This paper focuses upon the potential liability of DLT participants. This is because 
legal liability (if any) will simply not disappear with DLT, although it is often (from 
                                                 
investment in The DAO is a security for the purpose of US securities regulation); Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24:1 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016); Tsukerman, supra 
note 7, at 1153-1156. 
18 Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 
14 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 377 (2013); Twomey, supra note 7; Doguet, supra note 7; Grinberg, supra note 7, at 
171. 
19 The notable example being the notorious Silk Road: see United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 
569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Baker, supra note 
6, at 372-374; Comizio, supra note 6, at 135-138, 141-146, 162 et seq.; Max I. Raskin, Realm of the 
Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 970, 980-983 (2015); Tsukerman, 
supra note 7, at 1146-1159, 1166-1167. 
20 Cf. US Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, As the Use of Virtual Currencies in Taxable 
Transactions Becomes More Common, Additional Actions Are Needed to Ensure Taxpayer Compliance 
(Audit Report Ref No. 2016-30-083, Sept. 21, 2016); Nika Antonikova, Real Taxes on Virtual 
Currencies: What does the I.R.S. Say?, 34 VIRGINIA TAX. REV. 433 (2015); Erin M. Hawley & Joseph J. 
Colangelo, Bitcoin Taxation: Recommendations to Improve the Understanding and Treatment of Virtual 
Currency, 15 J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 4 (2014); Sarah Gruber, Trust, Identity, and 
Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 
32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 141 (2013); Tsukerman, supra note 7, at 1150-1152, 1159-1161; Twomey, 
supra note 7. From a German perspective: Boehm & Pesch, supra note 7 (mentioning extraordinary 
reliance on Bitcoin in the vicinity of Cyprus mandatory tax levies on deposits); KIM-PATRICK ECKERT, 
STEUERLICHE BETRACHTUNG ELEKTRONISCHER ZAHLUNGSMITTEL AM BEISPIEL SOG. BITCOIN-
GESCHÄFTE DB 2108-2111(2013). 
21 Cf. the underweighted common law dimension of distributed ledgers: Shawn Bayern, Dynamic 
Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE REV. ONLINE 
22 (2014); Raskin, supra note 19, at 970; Paech, supra note 17 at 23-34; from a German civil law 
perspective: Beck & König, supra note 7. Very little attention has been paid to the private law sphere in 
French regulation and the only legality mandate issued by French regulators dealt with AML and taxation 
issues. However, see Press Release, Michel Sapin, Ministre des finances et des comptes publics on 
Réguler les monnaies virtuelles (July 11, 2014), available at http://proxy-
pubminefi.diffusion.finances.gouv.fr/pub/document/18/17768.pdf (stating: "Limiter l’anonymat en 
imposant une prise d’identité lors de l’ouverture par un professionnel d’un compte en monnaies virtuelles 
pour un tiers, et en imposant une vérification d’identité pour les retraits et dépôts aux "distributeurs" de 
bitcoin" – transl. "To limit anonymity by imposing on professionals a duty of establishing identity when 
opening a virtual currency account for a third party, and by imposing on Bitcoin "distributors" a duty of 
verification of identity in case of withdrawal"). 
22 See CROSBY, ET.AL., BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BITCOIN (2016). 
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our perspective over-enthusiastically23) wished away by those who promote and 
analyse the technology24 or praise its economic potential.25 This matters, as 
distributed ledgers are often hailed as the answer to ever-increasing cybersecurity 
risks. While distributed ledgers may well be more secure than traditional centralized 
ledgers, recent events call for an analysis of who will bear DLT losses and 
responsibility for damages in connection with a blockchain. Some notable examples26 
include:  
• A hack from 2011 until February 2014 resulted in losses of 750,000 customer 
Bitcoins and 100,000 Bitcoins owned by the Japanese Mt. Gox Bitcoin 
exchange, then the largest Bitcoin exchange in the world. The leading 
explanation is that this was a hot wallet hack relying on a transaction 
malleability bug.27 Mt. Gox subsequently declared bankruptcy, citing losses 
from the hack amounting to US$473 million at the time of filing.28  
• In January 2015, Luxembourg- and London-based Bitstamp, by 2016 the 
second largest Bitcoin exchange in terms of volume traded, suffered from a 
hot wallet hack leading to the loss of 19,000 Bitcoins, valued at about US$5.1 
                                                 
23 See Massimo Morini, From 'Blockchain Hype' to a Real Business Case for Financial Markets, 45 J. 
FIN. TRANSFORMATION 30-40 (2017), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/risjofitr/1587.htm. 
24 Cf. Mélanie Dulong de Rosnay, Responsabilité, 203-204, in ABÉCÉDAIRE DES ARCHITECTURES 
DISTRIBUÉES (Cécile Méadel & Francesca Musiani eds., 2015) (stating, without in-depth legal analysis, 
that distributed networks would be neither property nor contract nor otherwise legally governed); 
Mélanie Dulong de Rosnay, Peer-to-Peer as a Design Principle for Law: Distribute the Law, 6 J. PEER 
PROD. 2 (2015), available at http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-6-disruption-and-the-law/peer-
reviewed-articles/peer-to-peer-as-a-design-principle-for-law-distribute-the-law/ (taking the position that 
law focuses on individual rights and arguing in favor of an expansion and adaptation of law to assign 
rights and obligations to communities rather than individiuals). However, see Paech, supra note 17, at 
23-24, 28 (stating that system issues render enforcement difficult, implying that legal claims are granted 
by the law, and demanding that “de facto acquisition on the basis of the operation of software needs to 
be recognised by private law itself” – without further details). 
25 Alistair Milne, Cryptocurrencies from an Austrian Perspective (Working Paper, May 18, 2017), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2946160. 
26 See also Murphy, Murphy & Seitzinger, supra note 7, at 8-9 (citing an additional five ‘smaller’ liability 
events in 2012 and 2013, including Bitcoin Savings and Trust’s insolvency (US$5.6 million in damages), 
the hacks of Bitfloor (US$250,000), Instawallet (US$4.6 million), and Australian Bitcoin Bank (more 
than US$1 million) and Bitcoin Foundation). 
27  Doubts persist as to the technical reason for this loss. The fact that 200,000 Bitcoin were later found 
on a discarded hard drive was troubling. See The Troubling Holes in MtGox’s Account of How It Lost 
$600 Million in Bitcoins, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (April 4, 2014), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526161/the-troubling-holes-in-mtgoxs-account-of-how-it-lost-
600-million-in-bitcoins/ (last visited June 16, 2017). 
28 See Daniel Carey, Mt. Gox Trading Halts as Bitcoin Businesses Move to Assure Investors, COINDESK 
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-trading-halts-bitcoin-businesses-move-assure-
investors/ (last visited June 16, 2017); Eleanor Warnock, Takashi Mochizuki & Alexander Martin, Mt. 
Gox Files for Bankruptcy Protection, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mt-gox-files-for-liquidation-1397625896 (last visited June 30, 2017); 
Tsukerman, supra note 7, at 1149-1150; Comizio, supra note 6, at 138-140. 
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million. Bitstamp subsequently suspended services for nearly a week during 
which client deposits were not accessible.29 
• In 2016, US$53 million of the over US$150 million crowd funded assets in 
DLT-based virtual currency ETHER held in the investor-directed DLT-
enabled Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)30 were channelled 
to a third-party controlled account after exploiting previously published 
vulnerabilities31 in the DAO code.32 A White Hat or Robin Hood counter 
attack led to most of the lost Ether being recaptured. 
• In 2016, Hong-Kong-based Bitfinex, one of the world’s largest bitcoin 
exchanges, lost 119,756 Bitcoins with a market value at the time of between 
US$66-72 million in a hack that involved its multi-signature accounts.33 It was 
decided to apportion losses from the theft across the company’s clients and 
assets, widening the group of those affected by the losses beyond those 
holding the multi-signature accounts that were hacked. Accordingly, all 
Bitfinex clients lost a significant 36% of their holdings.34 
As these examples show, risk does not vanish if financial services are provided via 
distributed ledgers. With DLT, the data, and the risks, formerly concentrated in a 
centralized ledger are distributed across all participants (‘nodes’).  
The analysis in this paper of the liabilities associated with DLT should serve 
regulators, globally, who are currently working to identify risks likely to arise from 
DLT, as well as market participants involved in DLT systems. In particular, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is reported to be 
“working to identify risks to business models from digital disruption like the 
blockchain”,35 with European regulator ESMA (the European Securities and Markets 
                                                 
29 Mariella Moon, Bitcoin Exchange Loses $5 Million in Security Breach, ENGADGET, 
http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/06/bitstamp-bitcoin-exchange-hack/ (last accessed July 10, 2017). 
30 The DAO is associated with a Swiss company, but its main actors are German. For an overview of the 
DAO’s architecture, see Vlad Zamfir & Emin Gün Sirer, A Call for a Temporary Moratorium, 4-7 
(Revised draft report, May 30, 2016), available at 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/10kTyCmGPhvZy94F7VWyS-
dQ4lsBacR2dUgGTtV98C40/edit#heading=h.exdzp88avpn4 (last visited July 15, 2017). 
31 See Dino Mark, Vlad Zamfir & Emin Gün Sirer, A Call for a Temporary Moratorium on “The DAO”, 
HACKING DISTRIBUTED (May 27, 2016), http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-
moratorium/ (last visited July 10, 2017). 
32 See Russel Brandom, How an Experimental Cryptocurrency Lost (and Found) $53 Million, THE 
VERGE (June 17, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/17/11965192/ethereum-theft-dao-
cryptocurrency-million-stolen-bitcoin (last visited July 10, 2017). 
33 Stan Higgins, The Bitfinex Bitcoin Hack: What We Know (And Don't Know), COINDESK (Aug. 3, 
2016), http://www.coindesk.com/bitfinex-bitcoin-hack-know-dont-know/ (last visited July 3, 2017). 
34 All Bitfinex Clients to Share 36% Loss of Assets Following Exchange Hack, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/07/bitfinex-exchange-customers-receive-36-
percent-loss-tokens (last visited June 16, 2017). 
35 ASIC, supra note 2; see also EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS AUTHORITY (ESMA), DISCUSSION 
PAPER: THE DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO SECURITIES MARKETS (June 2, 2016), 
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-773_dp_dlt.pdf. 
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Authority)36 and other IOSCO members entering into large scale fact gathering and 
analysis. In a similar vein, the Financial Stability Board has started to look into risks 
and vulnerabilities created by Blockchain.37 
This paper is structured as follows. Part II considers the move from concentrated to 
distributed ledgers and analyses the underlying features of DLT which make it so 
potentially attractive to financial services, in particular its security, and its related 
characteristics of transparency and immutability.  
Part III reveals that joint control is the pre-eminent feature of distributed ledgers, 
regardless of whether the system is permissioned or permissionless. Part III also 
outlines the legal consequences of joint control, demonstrating that regardless of 
whether considered from the standpoint of the law of torts, contracts or 
partnership/company law, joint control potentially results in joint liability. We further 
show that joint control impacts the legal consequences of the three most likely risk 
sources in a blockchain which include (1) failures at the level of the node, (2) failures 
at the level of client/user, and (3) unintended third party access (cyber attack).  
Part IV ponders the consequences for regulated intermediaries and regulatory systems 
that seek to participate in distributed ledger systems. Institutions need to consider 
carefully the legal design of any such system. If a distributed ledger links multiple 
legal entities, all entities in the system need to consider contingent liability risk, 
including putting risk and compliance management systems in place and holding 
appropriate levels of risk capital (and/or providing for meaningful insurance 
coverage). While some may believe that from a technology perspective distributed 
ledgers may be difficult to set up38 and easier to handle long-term, from a legal 
perspective the opposite may be true: they are easy to set up but come with ongoing 
longterm legal consequences. From a pure risk perspective concentrating 
precautionary measures and liability in one entity (a joint venture) that holds the legal 
title in multiple ledgers could turn out to be the best solution. While this concentrated 
design works well among the subsidiaries of one financial conglomerate, it is doubtful 
that independent financial institutions will be willing to give up control over their 
clients’ data in this way.  
Part V concludes by considering these options. 
 
                                                 
36 See ESMA, supra note 2. 
37 See Press Release, Meeting of the Financial Stability Board in Tokyo on 30-31 March 2016, available 
at http://www.fsb.org/2016/03/meeting-of-the-financial-stability-board-in-tokyo-on-30-31-march/ (last 
accessed July 7, 2017) (“The Plenary reviewed major areas of financial technology innovation, including 
distributed ledger technology, and proposed a framework for categorising them and assessing any 
financial stability implications. Plenary members discussed the issues raised for public authorities by 
these technologies, possible steps to address potential risks, and opportunities for cooperation in the FSB 
and with the standard-setting bodies to deepen analysis and develop regulatory perspectives”). 
38 While traditional setup takes time, effort and ressources Blockchain-as-a-Service (BAAS) providers 
such as IBM (“IBM Blockchain”), Microsoft (“Azure”) and Intel enable the setup of a full-meshed 
network in less than an hour.  
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II. Features of Distributed Ledger Technology 
A. The Ledger Concept 
The modus operandi of distributed ledgers is best understood by looking at their 
counterpart, the centralized ledger. Centralized ledgers are the most common data 
storage device in finance today. In a centralized ledger, data are stored on the ledger, 
and the trusted administrator of the ledger maintains it, recording transfers of assets 
and the like upon receipt of appropriately verified notifications. Risks exist. The 
ledger could be destroyed, or more likely, hacked or otherwise compromized, so that 
the original data are held for ransom or manipulated and replaced by new (inaccurate) 
data. Mathematical approaches can be used to define how much effort is necessary to 
manipulate any given server. As such every single server can be manipulated with 
sufficient computing power.39  
Figure 1: 
 
Source: Paul Baran, On Distributed Communication Networks, 196240 
 
                                                 
39 In theory, any system including a distributed system can be brute forced, trespassing preventive 
controls. If all else fails, attackers may turn to brute force attacks, i.e. multiple password guessing. System 
operators may counter by using detective controls. See Dinei Florêncio, Cormac Herley & Baris Coskun, 
Do Strong Web Passwords Accomplish Anything?, HOTSEC'07 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND USENIX 
WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN SECURITY (2007); Jung-Sik Cho, Sang-Soo Yeo & Sung Kwon Kim, 
Securing Against Brute-Force Attack: A Hash-based RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol Using A 
Secret Value, 34 Computer Comm. 391 (2011); Jung-Sik Cho, Young-Sik Jeong & Sang OhPark, 
Consideration on the Brute-Force Attack Cost and Retrieval Cost: A Hash-based Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID) Tag Mutual Authentication Protocol, 69(1) COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS 
APPLICATIONS 58 (2015). 
40 Baran’s diagram for distributed ledgers is now inaccurate. In modern distributed ledgers, in principle, 
all nodes are connected and communicate with each other. 
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Distributed ledgers address these problems by raising the barriers for manipulation of 
stored data. Rather than relying on the hub-and-spokes model of centralized ledgers, 
or the hubs and spokes of decentralized ledgers, in distributed ledgers many data 
storage points (nodes) are all connected with each other and store all data 
simultaneously, and together constitute the common ledger. DLT requires consensus 
of those nodes rather than just the confirmation by one hierarchically structured 
storage device, as with a centralized ledger. The technical details of how to achieve 
consensus vary – technology allows for instance for proof-of-work concepts,41 or 
proof-of-stake concepts – and the technology adopted defines how the consensus 
mechanism can be gamed. Regardless, data stored on a distributed ledger is less likely 
to be manipulated in any given case as compared to data stored on one equally secure 
server.  
Assume there are N nodes (rather than one centralized ledger) and E describes the 
effort necessary to break into any single server. Given that all other conditions 
(security of each server etc.) are equal,42 we would expect the efforts necessary to 
manipulate all servers linked in the ledger to be N x E rather than 1 x E. The number 
of servers that will need to be manipulated to manipulate the outcome will depend on 
the number of servers necessary for consensus and the number of nodes involved. If 
N>1 the distributed ledger is more secure than the concentrated one.  
‘Blockchain’ refers to how data are stored on the ledger. Rather than being stored 
individually, data are stored in a block bundled with other data. The block serves as 
the container of multiple data points, and all blocks are stored in a specific order (the 
‘chain’). Each block contains a timestamp and a link to the previous block. Rather 
than manipulating one point alone, the bundling of multiple datasets in one block 
requires a cyber attack to manipulate the whole block of data as well as – due to the 
time stamp and link – the blocks before and after the attacked block.  
B. Permissioned vs Permissionless DLTs 
DLT can take various forms. In particular, DLT systems can be permissioned or 
permissionless. Permissioned systems are essentially private networks where data 
authorization depends upon the agreement of multiple pre-defined servers. 
Permissioned systems require an organization and governance structure regulating at 
least who is permitted to participate and usually the basis upon which they will 
participate. For instance, DLT-based peer-to-peer digital payment network Ripple 
                                                 
41 In a proof-of-work system, multiple servers (‘nodes’) all try to solve one mathematical problem. 
Solving the problem requires data processing capacity and energy. The first node to solve the problem is 
compensated, while all others use the solution provided by the first node to ensure that the problem is 
correctly solved; thereby the solution to the mathematical problem assumes the function of a unique, 
one-time-use code. 
42 In practice, nodes of a distributed system do not typically have the same level of security as 
concentrated systems: 1) a chain is only as strong as its weakest link (most of the times the endpoint and 
the human controlling it); 2) even if the DLT as “supra layer” is secure, the “underlying layer” may be 
less strong, and both pose risks to DLT security; 3) a distributed system is much more difficult to restore 
than a central system. If a central system is hacked and the date/time can be determined, running the 
ledger on a backup could effectively counter the hacker attack (as long as the backup has not been 
compromised). In a distributed system, due to governance issues once compromised there are no easy 
ways to restore the data chain. Altogether this undermines DLT security. See infra, at III.A.  
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utilizes a network of trusted parties (‘validation’ nodes) that constantly compare their 
transaction records.43 
In contrast, permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin operate on public domain 
software and allow anyone who downloads and runs the software to participate. In 
some cases even the code is further developed in the public domain. The participants 
in those distributed ledgers may not know who else is running a server functioning as 
a node at any given time. There is an additional security element in the unknown 
inherent in this structure: if the number of overall nodes is known a cyberattack may 
be planned with greater certainty given that the maximum number of nodes is 
certain.44 If nodes come and go depending on participants, efforts focused on certain 
nodes may prove fruitless if those nodes have stopped operations, or are in excess of 
the number needed for consensus. The number of nodes required for a consensus is 
set in the code underlying the system and is thus a fundamental aspect of the design of 
any system. This also provides one of the major known vulnerabilities in many 
blockchain systems, including Bitcoin. 
C. Storage Trust Issue Solved 
The solution to the storage trust issue leads to efficiency gains wherever storage trust 
is of the essence. Since most financial intermediation is based on trust – clients give 
their financial or other resources to someone else – enhancing trust in storage could 
reduce risk premiums resulting from a lack of trust. 
However, the trust that the ledger is maintained and thus the data retrievable (similar 
to a book copy that is stored in the archives) depends on the system’s design. All 
systems face the risk of “invalidity through obsolescence and boredom”45: Without a 
community of nodes running the protocol and verifying transactions the system stops 
working. If all members have moved to a new system all data stored on the 
blockchain cease to exist. DLs pay nodes directly or indirectly for running the 
protocol. For instance, Bitcoin maintains incentives with ‘mining’: “by assigning parts 
of the ledger to miners who, competing with each other, win the proof-of-work 
lottery. Incentivization is critical to ensure that miners do not grow bored and stop 
mining, thereby failing to provide the essential verification mechanism.”46  
D. Examples 
There are multiple fields where DLT may have great potential. One of the most 
widely discussed applications of storage trust relates to clearing and settlement. 
Generally, a central securities depositary functions as a centralized ledger which 
                                                 
43 For a brief overview on Ripple’s technology, see Vitalik Buterin, Introducing Ripple - A Detailed Look 
at Cryptocurrency's New Kid on the Block, 8 BITCOIN MAG (2013) (the technology underlying Ripple is 
able to integrate established financial intermediaries which may explain Ripple’s current success); see 
also Diana Ngo, Banks Unite Around Ripple to Launch Blockchain-Based Cross-Border Wiring Service, 
COIN JOURNAL (April 3, 2017), https://coinjournal.net/banks-unite-around-ripple-launch-new-cross-
border-wiring-service/ (last accessed June 16, 2017). 
44 IT experts refer to this strategy as “security through obscurity”. 
45 DuPont & Maurer, supra note 5. 
46 Id. 
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records all transactions and changes in ownership. All custodians and depositaries are 
linked to the CSD, and clearing and settlement costs are defined by the CSD’s 
charges. With DLT, the centralized ledger could be replaced by a distributed network 
of certain core depositaries holding together the various securities. This proposition 
would become more powerful in combination with smart contracts leading to 
automatic execution. 
Another potential use for DLT includes fields where proprietary access to data creates 
or enhances a dominant position in a market. With DLT, data access is mutualized. 
This may create both opportunities and difficulties. If we envision an AML/KYC hub 
being maintained for a financial centre like Hong Kong or Luxembourg, no entity 
would consent to its competitor holding its client data. A DLT system may enable a 
compromise in that all entities simultaneously hold all client data and could therefore 
benefit greatly from scale economies resulting from, for instance, AML/KYC checks 
needing to only be undertaken once. At the same time, given the sensitivity of data, 
financial institutions would insist on the most secure technology. DLT could 
simultaneously address the governance and storage trust issues associated with a 
centralized AML/KYC hub.47  
III. DLT and the Risks of Distributed Liability 
DLT addresses the storage trust issue. DLT ensures the validity of datasets by 
spreading data over many nodes which have to agree, via the previously determined 
consensus mechanism, to confirm data validity. DLT can ensure better than other 
technologies that data are not manipulated while stored. DLT can also ensure that the 
party making a transfer has title on the ledger to the asset being transferred, and is not 
able to transfer it twice to separate buyers. However, beyond these inbuilt protections, 
DLT does not make inaccurate data accurate. Inaccurate data stored via DLT remains 
inaccurate. The ‘garbage in, garbage out’ dilemma holds.48  
The important point here is that while DLT may enhance data security, it is not bullet 
proof. DLT has certain characteristics which could result in undesirable data 
distribution, data loss or data manipulation. All of these lead to questions about 
responsibility and liability, issues considered in this section. 
A. Liability Risks Associated with DLT 
DLT commonly gives rise to at least three major types of potential liability risk: 
ledger transparency risks, cyber risks and operational risks. 
                                                 
47 DLT could be beneficial regardless of which data can be accessed by users of the AML/KYC hub. 
Access to data may be organized differently than storage. For instance, financial institutions that rely on 
the client data stored via the ledger may receive only a green/yellow/red light, while their underlying 
server infrastructure achieves consensus on the data that provide the basis for the AML/KYC assessment. 
48 This facilitates abuse as the dividing line between true and false information is blurred. See Gruber, 
supra note 20, at 135 (citing the case where an anonymous person threatened to disclose former 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s tax returns unless he was paid a certain amount; it was uncertain 
whether the tax data was accurate). 
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1. Risks from Increased Ledger Transparency 
DLT stores data by spreading them over multiple nodes. Every node operator has 
access to the data stored on the ledger.49 While a certain level of transparency is a 
precondition for the enhanced level of trust that DLT creates, the enhanced level of 
transparency could enable re-personalization of data stored on the distributed ledger, 
or enable nodes to make an informed guess as to identities entering into certain 
transactions. Two main legal risks derive from this enhanced level of transparency, 
one relating to data privacy and another to insider trading and market abuse.  
Violation of Data Privacy 
The transparency characteristics of distributed ledgers and data privacy are in tension. 
For instance, Bitcoin reveals considerable information about users’ profiles, enabling 
repersonalization of pseudonymous data.50 Indeed spreading data over multiple nodes 
may facilitate access to private data sets.51 Distribution of private data over the ledger 
could violate data protection laws. In some jurisdictions, penalties for violation of 
                                                 
49 For instance, in Bitcoin, all the data is on the blockchain except the identity of the owners. To know 
that, one requires the private key. The private key is stored on the owner’s wallet rather than the ledger. 
“However, anyone can see who owns each block, via its public header information, and can follow the 
links through the entire chain right back to the first block.” Cf. Jude Umeh, Blockchain Double Bubble 
or Double Trouble?, 58:1 ITNOW 58 (2016). 
50 Elli Androulaki, et al., Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin, FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 
(2013), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/596.pdf. See also Micha Ober, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and 
Kay Hamacher, Structure and Anonymity of the Bitcoin Transaction Graph, 5 FUTURE INTERNET 237 
(2013) (stating that according to Bitcoin protocol, "the balance associated with an address cannot be 
divided into smaller amounts. Nevertheless it is possible to use the same input address again as output 
address; this way only a fraction of the balance can be transferred to another address, whereas the 
remainder of a balance can be transferred back to the originator. This has, of course, negative implications 
on privacy: it allows to link different transactions, as an attacker can more accurately estimate the number 
of active entities (if there was no linkability, the new transaction would look as if it originated from a 
new entity." The authors also mention that, in order to maximize both the anonymity set of Bitcoin and 
the unlinkability of transactions, "an entity that is observable by an adversary by inspecting the Bitcoin 
block chain should be as small as possible (best case: single address, increasing the anonymity set) and 
only active for a short time (best case: single transaction, limiting transaction linkability). There can be 
numerous reasons why this is not achievable in practice. First of all, addresses belonging to known public 
entities like mining pools are of course active for a very long time and it would not be of much use to 
obfuscate those addresses. On the other hand, a user mining on a pool with the same payout address all 
the time or some entity accepting donations on a single address will weaken the privacy of those entities. 
Even though the Satoshi Bitcoin client generates a new address for remaining change—which should 
strengthen privacy—as the user still receives funds on the old/original address, both addresses are likely 
to be used as inputs in some future transaction the user makes, which then again allows a connection 
between the addresses to be made"); Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the 
Bitcoin System, 197–223, in SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKS (Yaniv Altshuler, ed., 2013) 
(tracking the flow of Bitcoin transactions in a small part of a Bitcoin log). See also Matthew Elias, 
Bitcoin: Tempering the Digital Ring of Gyges or Implausible Pecuniary Privacy (Oct. 3, 2011), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1937769 (stating that Bitcoin’s system architecture is analogous to that of 
the internet so the level of anonymity is similar to that on the internet, but finding that “anonymity on 
the internet is a function of one’s technical knowledge and ability, and of the amount of resources one is 
able to dedicate towards that end”). 
51 Cf. Garry Gabison, Policy Consideration for the Blockchain Technology Public and Private 
Applications, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 327, 330-335 (2016). 
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data protection rules are severe.52 Entities using DLT will need to consider and 
address their data privacy obligations carefully and rigorously.  
Another interference with privacy rights stems from the fact that data once stored on 
the ledger cannot be erased: this is the immutability feature of DLT. This may have 
devastating consequences to an individual or entity. For instance, assume that 
inaccurate data on the credit worthiness of a person or illicit pictures of children and 
young adults are spread over the ledger. This is at odds with the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
granted in some jurisdictions, so victims will turn to damages instead. More 
significantly, this is directly at odds with the requirements of law that in some 
circumstances transactions are void, and title must be rectified to reflect this, for 
instance in the context of fraudulent transfers. Immutabilty and the requirements of 
law will clash. 
Insider Trading and Market Abuse 
If DLT is used to store sensitive, valuable information it may facilitate a range of 
financial abuses including insider trading, tipping and market manipulation. ESMA is 
concerned that the 
shared and public features of DLT could facilitate market manipulation 
and other unfair practices. In the absence of proper safeguards, some 
could unduly exploit the information recorded in DLT, e.g., recent trades 
or inventories levels of other participants, to front-run competitors or 
manipulate prices.53   
While civil and criminal penalties for insider trading and market abuse are severe,54 
responsible entities may also face civil litigation in certain cases. Again users of DLT 
will have to guard scrupulously against this abuse of the information on the system. 
This highlights another set of potential risks of the transparency characteristic of 
DLT. 
Identity Theft 
While transparency is beneficial to data integrity it also facilitates access to assets 
through identity theft. In particular, if only the private key is required to divert assets 
and no central ledger authority is able to block access upon notice of loss, the private 
key itself becomes the target of illicit activities.55 
                                                 
52 For instance, under the European Data Protection Regulation that has come into force in May 2017, 
regulators may impose penalties of up to 4 percent of a firm’s turnover. See ESMA, supra note 2, at 11, 
¶42 (“ESMA realizes that the use of DLT could in some cases raise privacy risks in relation to client 
data”). 
53 See id., at 11, ¶38. 
54 See 15 U.S. Code § 78u–1 (Civil penalties for insider trading), allowing the court to impose penalties 
three times the profit gained or loss avoided. Under European law the penalties are even more severe, 
amounting to up to either 15% of the entity’s turnover for insider dealing, unlawful disclosure and market 
manipulation, or €15 million, whatever is higher. See Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 Art 
30(2). 
55 Jennifer J. Xu, Are Blockchains Immune to All Malicious Attacks?, 2:25 FIN. INNOV. 6 (2016). 
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2. Cyber risks 
Tampering with Data prior to Storage 
Second, DLT does not solve the general issue of data processing: inaccurate data 
remains inaccurate how ever it is stored. For instance, if data from a financial 
transaction are stored on a distributed ledger, the data will often be generated by just 
two entities, buyer and seller. Attacking the (weak) input link rather than the 
distributed ledger itself will lead to inaccurate data being distributed. If a cyber attack 
focuses on the transacting parties rather than the storage device (DLT), users relying 
on the ledger may not realize the inaccuracies and rely upon it. Permissionless 
distributed ledgerss are particularly exposed due to non-existing user/client 
enrolment/identity processes. With Bitcoin the weakest link is the Bitcoin owner’s 
wallet,56 i.e. the device in which the owner’s value is booked and is exclusively held 
by the owner similar to a bearer instrument. For instance, in the Mt. Gox case attacks 
were directed towards the weak input link rather than the ledger itself.   
Brute Force Attack and Cheats 
Even in what DLT is best at – safe storage – a distributed ledger has its limits. In 
particular, rules on how proof-of-work concepts determine consensus may reduce the 
reliability of the technology. For instance, in the blockchain that underlies Bitcoin just 
five nodes together process approximately 85% of all mathematical problems, i.e. 
mining of coins.57 The ledger is partly recentralized. If one attacks nodes that cover 
the required consensus level, then the chain could be compromised.58 At the same 
time, in proof-of-stake systems there is a central storage or processing device on 
which the stakes are calculated which could be targeted, thus in a permissioned 
blockchain a cyberattack could target the devices determining the governance of the 
blockchain (i.e. the vote calculator), etc.59 These are examples of a distributed ledger 
being broken by brute force, i.e. bundling computing power to attack multiple nodes 
simultaneously.60 Since this requires an enormous amount of computing power – in 
theory, a Bitcoin attacker needs at least 51 % more computing power than the network 
                                                 
56 Cf. Umeh, supra note 49, at 58; Press Release, European Banking Authority, EBA Warns Consumers 
on Virtual Currencies (Dec. 12, 2013), available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-warns-consumers-
on-virtual-currencies. 
57 BitCoin Mining Pools, BITCOIN MINING, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/bitcoin-mining-pools (last 
visited July 10, 2017). 
58 For instance, if a cyber attack targets the five most important nodes it has a high probability of hitting 
the node solving the particular mathematical problem. Given that impact on consensus is based on data 
processing volume in the blockchain, it could influence the results, as a result would have the support 
from 85% of the distributed ledger.could influence the results since a result would have the support from 
85% of the distributed ledger. 
59 David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REVIEW OF FINANCE 7 (2017). 
60 See Umeh, supra note 49, at 61 (stating that “although not totally impossible, such a hack is non-trivial, 
computationally prohibited activity to executive over a large distributed peer network"). Umeh assumes 
the presence of private participants, while the reality may include state-coordinated groups of attackers 
with resources unlimited by economic constraints. See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as 
Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 837, 859-865 (2015); ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 213 (2014). 
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already encompasses61 – an attack may be more successful that ‘convinces’ the 
necessary number of nodes (or cheats those nodes) to adopt an updated version of the 
ledger software through which the desired change is implemented.62 In fact, if all 
attacked nodes are of the same level of security as a centralized ledger, a brute force 
attack will require very significant effort from the attacker if all nodes are equally 
important and safe. Yet both conditions are unlikely to be true.  
First, as was shown above, transaction logic will lead to concentration among the 
nodes making some more important than others. For instance, in some virtual 
currency blockchains, nodes are compensated per transaction they complete, thus 
providing incentives to compete for transactions. Some of the most active nodes will 
process a high proportion of transactions leading to a concentration of data generation 
on those nodes.63 If consensus building is capacity oriented, as in some blockchains 
including Bitcoin, the attack must only result in control over more computing power 
than is retained by honest nodes,64 an instance referred to as ‘51% attack.’65 Thus, a 
cyber attack that focuses on the handful or so of nodes in which most transactions are 
concentrated, is more likely to be successful.66  
Second, some nodes will be safer than others, given that some owners will invest 
more in cybersecurity than others. It is safe to assume that the majority of nodes 
managed by non-professional institutions will be less secure than the cyber fortresses 
typical of important centralized ledgers. Rather than attacking all nodes in a 
distributed ledger where consensus is built, attacking the nodes with weaker security 
may be productive with less effort than that required for a brute force attack on all 
                                                 
61 See Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym for Bitcoin’s funder, or funding group of developers), Bitcoin: 
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited June 30, 
2017) (stating that “the system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power 
than any cooperating group of attacker nodes”). 
62 For instance, modification of the Bitcoin blockchain requires a majority of nodes to consent to the 
change. The fact that ledger software is complex and few node owners are computer literate facilitates a 
cheat based on misinterpretation of the code, see Walch, supra note 60, at 867-868; Christopher, supra 
note 7, at 173-174.  
63 Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey & Edward W. Felten, The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in 
the Presence of Adversaries, 11-13, in THE TWELFTH WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY (2013); Santiago Pontiroli, Well, That Excalated Quickly: From Penny-Stealing Malware To 
Multi-Million-Dollar Heists, A Quick Overview Of The Bitcoin Bonanza in the Digital Era, VIRUS 
BULLETIN CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 2014; Kevin D. Werbach, Trustless Trust, 61-64 (Working Paper, 
Aug. 14, 2016); Arthur Gervais, et al., Is Bitcoin a Decentralized Currency?, 3 IEEE SECURITY & 
PRIVACY 12, 54-60 (2014) (stating that while “[g]overnments and banks control almost every financial 
system; Bitcoin substitutes these powerful entities with other entities, such as IT developers and mining 
pool owners. … In this sense, Bitcoin now finds itself in unfamiliar territory: on one hand, the Bitcoin 
ecosystem is far from being decentralized; on the other, the system’s increasing centralization doesn’t 
abide by any transparent regulations or legislations”). 
64 Cf. Nakamoto, supra note 61, at 1. 
65 Cf. Walch, supra note 60, at 861 (citing Bitcoin proponent Antonopoulos, supra note 60, at 211-212). 
66 Safari Kasiyanto, Security Issues of New Innovative Payments and Their Regulatory Challenges, in 
Gabriella Gimigliano, BITCOIN AND MOBILE PAYMENTS - CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN UNION 
FRAMEWORK 153-155 (2016); Till Neudecker, Philipp Andelfinger & Hannes Hartenstein, A Simulation 
Model for Analysis of Attacks on the Bitcon Peer-to-Peer Network (Unpublished working paper, 2015), 
Till Neudecker, Philipp Andelfinger & Hannes Hartenstein, Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network (Unpublished 
working paper, 2016); Antonopoulos, supra note 60, at 211-212; Xu, supra note 55, at 5. 
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nodes simultaneously. These attacks promise better results when the attackers have 
access to advanced cryptoanalysis and the nodes’ encryption has lower standards.67 
Double Spending and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
Further potential liability events have been discussed in the information technology 
literature. These include double spending attacks where the same currency unit is 
simultaneously assigned to two different users so that both can spend the same coin at 
the same time.68 This disincentive is unlikey to stop attackers seeking to destroy the 
Bitcoin system “as a form of terrorism”,69 or merely harm its users.70  
Another potential threat stems from distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS). 
Again, DDOS is the more dangerous the more concentrated the ledger. For instance, 
in the Bitcoin ledger where a handful of mining pools control by far the most 
computing power, DDOS could bring, and have frequently brought,71 mining to a 
halt, interfering with the core system of predictable new Bitcoin creation. The more 
DLT is widely spread in the business sector the more likely it is that some rogue or 
terrorist may turn to DDOS. Even if immediately detected due to intense monitoring 
the effects are potentially severe. For instance, in the case of Bitcoin the BTC 
exchanges do closely monitor every move of every BTC made. In the case of 
detection, all exchanges will cease operations, and the value of BTC is likely to drop. 
As long as the operational deficiency prevails it would be extremely difficult to move 
the BTC from virtual currency to fiat currency. Clients whose assets were frozen will 
ask for reimbursement of their costs. 
                                                 
67 Danny Yuxing Huang, et al., Botcoin: Monetizing Stolen Cycles (Working Paper, 2014); James Wyke, 
The ZeroAccess Botnet – Mining and Fraud for Massive Financial Gain (Sophos Technical Paper, 2012); 
Crosby, et al.,  BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, 2 APPLIED INNOVATION REV. (2016); Walch, 
supra note 60, at 864. 
68 Cf. Nakamoto, supra note 61, at 7; Ghassan O. Karame and Elli Androulaki, Two Bitcoins at the Price 
of One? Double-Spending Attacks on Fast Payments in Bitcoin (Conference on Computer and 
Communication Security, 2012), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/248.pdf (demonstrating that 
double-spending attacks on fast payments can be mounted at low cost on the then-deployed versions of 
Bitcoin and that “the measures recommended by Bitcoin developers for the use of Bitcoin in fast 
transactions are not always effective in resisting double-spending” and proposing countermeasures that 
enable the detection of double-spending attacks in fast transactions); Antonopoulos, supra note 60, at 
211-212. 
69 Jörg Becker, et al., Can We Afford Integrity by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the Bitcoin 
Currency, 135, 148, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY (Rainer Böhme, ed., 
2013); cited in Christopher, supra note 7, at 176; Antonopoulos, supra note 60, at 211-212. 
70 Cf. Walch, supra note 60, at 862. 
71 For instance, on March 7, 2015, five Bitcoin mining pools were subject to a DDOS attack that 
prevented miners from mining for six hours. The attacker demanded five to ten bitcoins to end the attack. 
See Julia McGovern, Official Statement on the Last Week’s DDoS-attack against GHash.IO Mining Pool, 
CEX.IO (March 16, 2015), https://blog.cex.io/news/official-statement-on-the-last-weeks-ddos-attack-
against-ghash-io-mining-pool-14156 (last visited June 30, 2017). 
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3. Operational Risks 
Insufficient Coding 
While the standardization and automatization that form part of DLT mitigate – in 
principle – operational risk, an error once implemented in the code may easily spread 
over the whole system affecting a greater number of nodes and individuals than a 
concentrated ledger.72 This creates serious problems in light of the fact that “there is 
no such thing as flawless software; there are always errors or ‘bugs’ that negatively 
affect the performance of the software or make it vulnerable to attacky by hackers.”73 
In particular, poorly maintained, outdated or deficient code could open the door for 
system hacks, such as those that occurred in the Mt. Gox and DAO cases.74 
Key Person Risk 
Distributed ledgers rely on sophisticated software codes that are permanently 
rewritten in an effort to improve performance and security.75 As with all software, 
few experts understand the structure, and even fewer are able to adapt it if weaknesses 
of the code become known. This is particularly true in the case of permissionless 
ledgers, such as Bitcoin where  
[a] small group of core developers has password access to the code. They 
review and evaluate the suggestions made by other programmers, 
incorporate what they consider to be the good suggestions, and 
promulgate revised versions of the code for network adoption. They 
approve small changes by fiat, but for larger ones they moderate a public 
debate about the utility of the change. This bottleneck of human oversight 
doesn’t fit the narrative of central-bank-less currency, which may be why 
many advocates avoid discussing it. 76 
In all business organizations key people pose a risk to the organization – they could 
become sick, tired, mentally unwell, subject to extortion or corruption.77 Regardless 
of the reason if the trust put in key people is ill-placed the ledger’s security and 
reliability are at risk. This general risk may be increased in some distributed ledgers 
(such as Bitcoin) if the key people in charge fail to convince a sufficient number of 
users to update their version of the code, resulting de facto in a loss of key person 
                                                 
72 See ESMA, supra note 2, at 11, ¶38. 
73 See Walch, supra note 60, at 856. This is particularly true for the software underlying the Bitcoin 
system, see Walch, supra note 60, at 858 (detailing a list of bugs and identified fixes in n. 99-102). The 
statement counters the open source mantra according to which “the more eyes look at the code the more 
can fix and react”.  
74 See Xu, supra note 55, at 5. 
75 See Walch, supra note 60, at 865-867. 
76 See Christopher, supra note 7, at 150; see also on further examples, Grinberg, supra note 7, at 175-
176. 
77 See Walch, supra note 60, at 860-861 (citing Bitcoin proponent Antonopoulos, supra note 60, at 157, 
211). 
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capacity and an uncertain future of the ledger.78 If this happens questions will be 
asked as to who is accountable for the key person’s underperformance or misconduct.  
Negligent Performance 
For large scale financial services data, security and processing speed are of the 
essence. Assuming that a distributed ledger ensures certain security and processing 
standards to market participants in an effort to enhance market share, the question of 
who is responsible will be asked if the ledger fails to meet these standards. Another 
example of negligent performance (in this case on the user’s side) is the user sending 
virtual currency to the wrong address: is there anyone to whom the user can turn for 
redress?79 
B. Legal Consequences 
Even in light of its limits, DLT is likely the safest way to ensure that data are not 
modified. At the same time, DLT’s limits lead to legal questions. In particular, if a 
system may be broken or inaccurate or private data are stored via a distributed ledger, 
the legal question of who will be liable for losses will arise.  
This question is not easy to answer given that DLT is a technological, not a legal, 
concept. Operating a blockchain tells us, in the first instance, nothing about the legal 
scheme underpinning the blockchain. This has several implications.  
1. Applicable Law 
First, very few governments have as yet adopted a Blockchain law.80 That does not 
mean, however, that no law applies or, as has been stated, law’s focus needs to shift 
from individuals to (web) communities81 – we pesky lawyers cannot be so easily 
sidelined. Rather, lawyers facing innovation look at the legal system as a whole and 
apply the system’s foundational principles,82 and the law will provide an abundance 
                                                 
78 See Lulu Yilun Chen & Yuji Nakamura, Bitcoin Is Having a Civil War Right as It Enters a Critical 
Month, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/bitcoin-
risks-splintering-as-civil-war-enters-critical-month (stating that “[a]fter two years of largely behind-the-
scenes bickering, rival factions of computer whizzes who play key roles in bitcoin’s upkeep are poised 
to adopt two competing software updates at the end of the month. That has raised the possibility that 
bitcoin will split in two, an unprecedented event that would send shockwaves through the $41 billion 
market”). 
79 Example taken from Christopher, supra note 7, at 176. 
80 Arizona has adopted a blockchain law. Others are considering. 
81 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 
(1999) (arguing in favour of adaptation of the law to cyberspace); Dulong de Rosnay, supra note 22 
(positing that “distribution of actors and actions requires a rethinking of legal categories” since the 
“notions of the author of an action, content or object are no longer tangible units but aggregated, open-
ended and evolving fragments”). The author, however, confuses law with its enforcement. The facts 
mentioned may render enforcement difficult, but do not change the fact that the law assigns rights and 
liabilities even in a distributed system. See, on enforcement difficulties due to irreversibility of the 
blockchain, Paech, supra note 17, at 23-24. 
82 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) 
(demonstrating the importance of principles); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
WORLD (1995) (stating that principles are well equipped to govern complex technical concepts); Raskin, 
supra note 19, at 972 (“novel problems do not require novel solutions“). But see Paech, supra note 17, 
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of generally applicable principles, including the law of contracts, torts, property, 
partnerships and companies, some of which are enshrined in legislation while others 
(in particular in common law countries) are in case law which applies in the absence 
of specific legislation. Applying law to DLT will not be about “uncovering a 
functional equivalent – another [legal] institution that, although different in structure, 
serves the same purpose...”83, but will entail applying general principles in the 
absence of specific legislation.84 
2. Ledger Hierarchy 
Second, DLT tells us nothing about the entities involved nor their governance roles. 
For instance, multiple servers functioning as nodes can belong to one legal entity 
(firm or person) or financial group or multiple unrelated owners. With regard to 
governance, in the case of permissionless blockchains, node owners typically will not 
even know who else is part of the blockchain and a more or less ‘benevolent 
dictator’85 will make the decisions (or more precisely ‘dictators’ since a group of core 
developers will tend to call the shots), while a permissioned blockchain may have 
highly developed and legally sophisticated governance structures. 
For the purpose of generalization we rely on a DLT hierarchy involving five 
groups: 
(1) the core group that sets-up the code design and (de facto) governs the 
distributed ledger, for instance by having the technical ability and opinion 
leadership to prompt a ‘hard fork’ of the system (under certain conditions)86; 
(2) the owners of additional servers running the distributed ledger code for 
validation purposes (such as Bitcoin nodes = owners, Ripple validation nodes 
etc.), 
                                                 
at 23-24, 28 (stating that system issues render enforcement difficult, implying that legal claims are 
granted by the law, and demanding that “de facto acquisition on the basis of the operation of software 
needs to be recognised by private law itself” – without further details). 
83 Reyes, supra note 1, at 222-227 (summarizing comparative law methodology and suggesting an 
endogenous, functional approach). 
84 For instance, US courts and criminal enforcement agencies rigorously enforced criminal laws against 
Silk Road’s master mind Ross William Ulbricht, fitting Bitcoin into existing jurisprudence. See the 
references in supra note 19. 
85 David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger Currency 
Platforms, 15-16 (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 685, 2014), available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2349&context=law_and_economics  
(referring to the general structure underlying open source technology). 
86 See as an example, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOMPARE (April 
20, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-
fork/ (last visited June 18, 2017); for further examples, see Grinberg, supra note 7, at 175-176; 
Christopher, supra note 7, at 150. The US Financial Crime Enforcement Network applies its AML rules 
to “administrators and exchangers” of “convertible virtual currencies”: see Comizio, supra note 6, at 141 
et seq. Although FinCen does not mention the core developers, we deem “administrators” to include core 
developers. 
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(3) ‘qualified users’ of the distributed ledger, such as exchanges, lending 
institutions, miners etc;87 and  
(4) ‘simple users’ of the system, such as owners of Bitcoin,88 Ether or investors in 
the DAO; 
(5) third parties affected by the system without directly relying on the technology, 
for instance counterparties of, and banks lending to, ‘simple users’, clients of 
intermediaries that clear their financial assets via DLT, clients of brokers that 
hold virtual currency on behalf of clients, etc. 
Figure 2: Ledger Hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
3. Variety 
Third, DLT is a concept with multiple variations. From a distance Bitcoin, 
Ethereum, R3 and Ripple are all built on DLT so one is tempted to generalize, but up 
close they are very different animals. Generalizations are not warranted. Each DLT 
serves a certain use case which ranges from currency, pegged services, automatic 
execution of functions to permanent organizations.  
                                                 
87 The US Financial Crime Enforcement Network applies its AML rules to “administrators and 
exchangers” of “convertible virtual currencies”, see Comizio, supra note 6, at 141 et seq. “Exchangers“ 
include all qualified users in this sense. On the role of intermediaries in the Bitcoin blockchain, see 
Christopher, supra note 7, at 151, 174. 
88 In the Bitcoin ledger, validation nodes (element 2) and owners (element 3) are identical. 
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Figure 3: Blockchain Applications: End-User View89 
 
 
Depending on the DLT’s design and use case the number of users, the technical 
complexity and the delivery timeframe will vary – and so will the legal questions.  
As a result, when considering DLT from the accountability perspective, it is crucial 
to: 
(1) determine governance structure and entities involved;  
(2) clarify which legal standards apply to which DLT processes and services;  
(3) ensure the robustness of the IT processes given their great importance for the 
existence of the firm (from ‘important’ to ‘indispensable’), leading to 
enhanced regulatory attention with regard to server infrastructure, redundancy, 
access rights, server location, etc; 
(4) ensure that the algorithms achieve ‘correct’ results, requiring regulators to 
define which documentation (or data interfaces) need to be provided by 
intermediaries, which test routines must be embedded in the algorithms, and 
who has access to the source code and data bases used; and 
(5) clarify liability and responsibility for failure of the IT systems and algorithms. 
The remainder of this section focuses on the fifth question. 
C. Joint Control as Legal Qualification of a Blockchain 
If we factor in liability, embedding DLT in financial transactions may produce results 
that many will find surprising. A DLT entity (whether operator or participant) may 
need regulatory capital, counterparty risk controls, and other measures similar to other 
                                                 
89 Taken from William Mougayar, Understanding the Blockchain, O’REILLY (Jan. 16, 2016), 
https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/understanding-the-blockchain (last visited June 30, 2017). 
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forms of financial infrastructure (such as central counterparties). In turn the legal 
design of the DLT may look different from the technological design, for instance 
ownership may be distributed, concentrated or centralized. 
1. Code as law? – The Debate 
There is a lively debate as to whether ‘software code is law’.90 Three perspectives are 
relevant here.  
First, Lawrence Lessig originally meant ‘code is law’ as a metaphor, “in that the code 
controls behavior as law might control behavior”.91 Code design and structure will 
define the freedom of users: the code will determine what users can and cannot do, 
and what they must and must not do when using the system. This will be particularly 
so in the machine-based interactions often referred to as smart contracts.92 
Furthermore, some legislatures, such as that of Arizona, have clarified that smart 
contracts are as legally effective as other contracts, by enacting legislation giving 
legal status to smart contracts and blockchain based signatures, treating them as any 
ordinary contract or signature.93 In turn, contract law applies to blockchain based 
                                                 
90 To our knowledge the discussion dates back to Lawrence Lessig’s seminal book CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 24 et seq. (1999); Lawrence Lessig, Foreword, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2000); 
Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 
1405 (1999). From a legal perspective, the statement is ill-received. Statutes and cases comprise law; 
code can only be the subject of law. Legal authors tend to use the variant “code-as-law”: see Reyes, supra 
note 1, at 196. 
91 Lessig, Foreword, supra note 89, at 990; Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies, supra note 89, at 
1408 (arguing that “[t]he code of cyberspace—whether the Internet, or a net within the Internet— defines 
that space. It constitutes that space. And as with any constitution, it builds within itself a set of values 
and possibilities that governs life there … And the design of code is something that people are doing. 
Engineers make the choices about how the world will be. Engineers in this sense are governors”). 
92 See on smart contracts, the pioneering work by Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, in NICK 
SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE TUTORIALS (1997); and Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing 
Contracts, in NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE TUTORIALS (2002), available at 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool20
06/szabo.best.vwh.net/contractlanguage.html; see also Baker, supra note 6, at 360-363; Anthony J. 
Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts (Unpublished working paper, March 1, 2017), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927459; Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and 
Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2014); Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola & 
Addi Rull, Smart Contracts, 133, in THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ETECHNOLOGIES (Tanel Kerikmäe & Addi 
Rull, eds., 2016); Koulu, Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolutions: Smart Contracts as an Alternative 
to Enforcement, 13 SCRIPTED 40, 43-69 (2016); Karen E. C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: 
Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and The Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 
1 (2017); Cheng Lim, et. al., Smart Contracts: Bridging the Gap Between Expectation and Reality 
(Oxford Legal Stud. Res. Paper, July 11, 2016), available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2016/07/smart-contracts-bridging-gap-between-expectation-and-reality; Riika Kevin D. 
Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2936294; Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain 
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 10-12 (Unpublished manuscript, March 12, 2015), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664. 
93 See Arizona Gives Legal Status to Blockchain Based Smart Contracts, TRUSTNODES (April 3, 2017), 
http://www.trustnodes.com/2017/04/03/arizona-gives-legal-status-blockchain-based-smart-
contracts?utm_content=bufferd6cf5&utm_medium=social&utm_source=linkedin.com&utm_campaign
=buffer (last visited April 30, 2017) (stating “[a] signature that is secured through blockchain technology 
is considered to be in an electronic form and to be an electronic signature. A record or contract that is 
secured through blockchain technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to be an electronic 
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contracts, removing any uncertainty and making it clear that any blockchain based 
agreement is fully enforceable in a court of law. 
The second dimension includes the questions of who owns the distributed ledger 
software code; this is a question of property or copyright law and the legal protection 
of designs. The answer may have repercussions, however, as to the question of who is 
responsible for the code from a tort law perspective, addressed in section III.D.2 
below. 
The third perspective relates to the question of the legal treatment of the cooperation 
underlying a distributed ledger. Questions in this analysis include: are those 
cooperating in a system liable for failures, and who among all the various nodes bears 
the legal responsibility for system hacks? These questions are of particular importance 
with regard to the legal design of a distruted ledger system; the remainder of this 
section addresses these questions. 
We will focus on the third issue of whether there are legal grounds for liability before 
arguing against the ‘code-is-law’ argument as a defence against the liability claim (if 
any), which is considered in more depth in section III.D.5. 
2. Application of Law to the Distributed Ledger 
With regard to the question of the legal treatment of the cooperation underlying a 
distributed ledger, the type of cooperation created by code is of legal relevance:94  
First, in general, law covers all relations among people and items owned and 
controlled by them. There is no carve-out for cooperation in a distributed ledger.  
Second, no legislature is likely to enact an exception to this catch-all characteristic of 
law as it would promote irresponsible behaviour by those controlling the distributed 
ledger. No legal system could afford a carve out for DLT interactions, given the 
loopholes it would create.  
Third, the discussion as to whether human beings are responsible for machines is of 
long-standing, since at least the industrial revolution. In all jurisdictions of which we 
are aware the answer to this question has been the same: the law will cover, and be 
applied to, new situations and inventions appropriately modified to the new 
circumstances.  
Further, individual transactions executed via a distributed ledger are likely to be 
contracts – with all related consequences, whether recorded only in code or in words. 
Each transaction is likely to give rise to liability in the event of failure; which will 
sound in real-world obligations, and potentially in bankruptcy. 
The fact that law will apply is to be distinguished from the question of which law will 
apply. This will be determined by the application of the conflicts of law rules of the 
                                                 
record. Smart contracts may exist in commerce.  A contract relating to a transaction may not be denied 
legal effect, validity or enforceability solely because that contract contains a smart contract term”). 
94 Cf. Koulu, supra note 92, at 54. 
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courts with potential jurisdiction over the matter, including their treatment of any 
choice of law provision in any agreement establishing the DLT.95   
3. Distributed Ledgers vs. Business Networks 
From the outset, one is inclined to liken distributed ledgers to traditional ‘business 
networks’ (such as franchise systems, credit card networks and supply chains 
involving multiple parties). However, distributed ledgers differ from such traditional 
hybrid organizations96 in one important respect: While all members of the network 
(e.g. franchisor and franchisees) are linked together by the common business interest 
(for instance, in the brand appeal), from a legal perspective traditional business 
networks follow the hub-and-spokes model, where the spokes (e.g. the franchisees) 
are connected to the other spokes only indirectly through a contractual relationship to 
the ‘hub’ (for instance, the franchisor). The fact that the legal connection is a mere 
indirect one functions as a legal barrier: Rather than treating the whole operation as 
one multilateral contract or business organization due to their economic connection97 
all contracts between hub and the spokes have bilateral effect only. This prompts three 
consequences. First, one spoke has no legal standing to sue the another spoke for 
unfaithful conduct with regard to the common objective: In a hub-and-spoke network, 
in the absence of contracts with explicit third-party benefits defined, there is no 
loyalty owed to the network; and in principle courts are reluctant to find implied terms 
based on loyalty to the overall organization, fair dealing, ‘business necessity’ and 
standard business practice.98 Second, legal action must follow the path predefined by 
contractual relationships. In the absence of explicit bilateral contracts parties to a 
network cannot bring economic claims against each other. In particular, one spoke 
cannot recover pure economic loss ‘horizontally’, i.e. from the other spoke rather than 
                                                 
95 LORD COLLINS, ET. AL., DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2016); ADRIAN 
BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS (2014). 
96 Hugh Collins, Introduction to Networks as Connected Contracts, 11 et seq., in GÜNTHER TEUBNER, 
NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (2011). 
97 This was suggested by Teubner, id., at 145 et seq.; his position finds support in scholarship, see for 
instance: Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990); Roger Brownsword, Network Contracts Revisited, 31, in NETWORKS: 
LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION (Marc Amstutz & Günther Teubner, eds., 2009); the 
contributions in THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACT: FROM EXCHANGE TO LONG-TERM NETWORK 
COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Stefan Grundmann, Fabrizio Calaggi & Giuseppe Vettori, 
eds., 2013). However, to our knowledge, this approach has not received general support by the courts. 
For an analysis of the English courts’ case law, see Collins, supra note 95, at 35 et seq. 
98 See, for instance, on franchise systems, Burger King Corp v Family Dining, 426 FSupp 485 (ED Pa), 
aff’d, 556 F2d 1168 (3d Cir 1977) (arguing in favour of a strict interpretation in a case where the 
franchisee had, with significant investment, opened 9 franchise stores where his contractual obligations 
amounted to opening 10 stores); Taylor Equip Co v John Deere Co, 98 F3d 1028 (8th Cir., 1996) (finding 
that the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing do not override express terms); Bak-a-Lum Corp of 
America v Alcoa Building Products, 351 A2dn 349 (New Jersey, 1976) (stating that implied duties 
override express provisions in cases of extreme dishonesty and unfairness and extreme losses on the side 
of the franchisee); Seven Eleven Corporation of SA (PTY) Ltd v Cancun Trading No 150 CC, Case No 
108/2004, 24 March 2005 (limiting the rebates to be distributed under a rebate sharing agreement with 
franchisees to rebates granted for bulk purchases, assigning other rebates and soft commission to the 
franchisor); Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2002] UKPC 50 (7 October 2002) 
(finding an implied term of good faith that prevents the franchisee to call other franchisees for a strike). 
The courts’ reluctance regarding implied obligations has prompted criticism, for instance in Hadfield, 
supra note 97. 
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the hub. The spoke sued will invoke the doctrine of privity of contract and in tort law 
challenge the standing of the claimant.99 Third, there is no external liability of ‘the 
network’ vis-à-vis third parties; rather, each spoke and the hub will be treated 
separately, and liability must be established against them individually.100  
By contrast, rather than indirectly through a hub, in a distributed ledger all nodes 
(group 2 of our hierarchy) are linked directly together, in that they together 
communicate in the consensus process and thereby determine which data stored via 
the ‘the common ledger’ is right and wrong. This connection removes the hierarchical 
relation derived from the hub to spoke characteristic for business networks and 
justifies the term ‘peer-to-peer networks’. In turn we find no difference between 
horizontal and vertical anymore – all links to other nodes are by definition ‘on the 
same level’, pursuing a common objective. From a legal perspective, the connection 
provides the (in business networks: missing) link between the network partners. 
Where traditional business networks are mere virtual networks, distributed ledgers are 
‘real’ networks – with a real physical (tech) link. While distributed ledgers vary in 
terms of software processes and thus their legal qualification is likely to vary, we 
posit that legal consequences follow from this direct link among the nodes: It is the 
tipping point at which a loose assembly of self-interested entities turns into a group of 
entities legally tied together.  
3. ‘Shared control’ as a Common Feature of Distributed Ledgers 
The very fact of distribution among many ledgers which together perform a 
commercially relevant function renders legal consequence likely. At the same time, 
the joint performance assigns to all nodes together significant influence over all users’ 
positions in that they can together exclude any single user from participation. For 
instance, if all but one user upload a new software version incompatible with the old 
one, the value of the remaining user’s position in the ledger suffers.101 In most 
systems, agreement among a 51% majority of nodes or computing power is 
determinative. The operations of the information technologies interacting in a 
distributed ledger could be treated like those of the human beings controlling the 
servers and computers on which the software runs, or be treated like items a person is 
responsible for, similar to an animal or a car. In this case, the law would ask whether 
the person engaged in negligent conduct, i.e. violated a standard of care when the item 
inflicted harm on someone.  
We infer from such quasi-organizational characteristics of the distributed ledger 
which go beyond mere economic interest that the whole ledger has a purpose or aim – 
                                                 
99 Cf. Collins, supra note 96, at 14-15, 51-63 (citing English and German case law). 
100 Cf. id., at 64-71. 
101 On March 11, 2013, an inadvertently created hard fork due to incompatibility of Bitcoin 0.7 with 
Bitcoin 0.8 almost destroyed value stored via the Bitcoin blockchain. The core developer convinced one 
significant exchange to reinstall the old version. The exchange controlled sufficient computing power 
within the Bitcoin’s system to shift the majority consensus back to version 0.7. See Gruber, supra note 
20, at 164; NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS AND 
MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 194-195 (2015); Walch, supra note 60, at 865-867. This 
example is evidence of both the importance of core developers and the concentration of computing power 
in the Bitcoin blockchain. 
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the joint performance of the ledger service – from which obligations to cooperate and 
of loyalty as well as internal and external liability could follow.  
For instance, the distributed ledger could be deemed a joint venture. The core group 
that sets up the system is a clear potential example, but this could extend further, for 
instance if nodes contribute and benefit to the same extent as the core group or even 
‘simple users’ could be deemed joint venturers by third parties that rely on their 
service. One could also understand the joint performance to constitute a multi-party 
contract with the core group and all nodes functioning as contractors that commit to 
adhere to the processing rules and maintain a certain level of security. If the core 
group fails to deliver, or one or more of the nodes does not perform the necessary 
processes or does not maintain the minimum data security level, the fellow 
contractors could rely on contractual liability. In some jurisdictions we may also find 
sufficient ground to argue that the distributed ledger is an incorporated business 
organization or partnership.  
Once it is established that distributed ledgers have a sufficiently close organizational 
relation (regardless of how this is legally interpreted in any given jurisdiction) duties 
based on good faith as determined by the common good, liability among the ledgers 
(i.e. internal network liability) and liability to third parties (i.e. external network 
liability) could be presumed to arise. In turn, one node owes to the other loyalty (for 
instance, regular software and hardware updates to maintain the ledger’s 
performance) and is directly liable for economic loss in case of its breach. Further, if a 
third party is damaged by inaccurate or insecure data storage which is, as was shown, 
possible, the third party could direct its claim based on tort law or special liability 
statutes102 to all nodes together.  
This preliminary result arises in light of the six features of distributed ledgers103 
including: 
(1) joint access to data (‘distributed’); 
(2) joint information about the process (‘publicity’ / ’transparency’); 
(3) joint administration (in that no single ledger alone can determine the outcome) 
(‘decentralized’);  
(4) joint development, i.e. to change the underlying code some consensus 
mechanism is necessary and no single node alone can determine the outcome; 
(5) permanence – data cannot be erased, a permanent log is maintained in which 
all transactions may be tracked by order of processing; and  
(6) verifiability – the above features combine to mean data cannot be amended 
while stored except through a major, trackable process (‘immutability’). 
                                                 
102 In some common law countries special liability statutes were implemented to provide a greater degree 
of certainty in the field of tort law. See infra, at D.2. 
103 See DuPont & Maurer, supra note 5 (arguing that key characteristics of a blockchain include that the 
ledger is “distributed, decentralized, public or transparent, time-stamped, persistent, and verifiable”). 
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From a legal perspective some type of liability – joint, several or proportionate – 
could arise from this joint control towards third parties and among the nodes 
themselves. Which type of liability will arise will depend on the details of the DLT 
system, in particular the consensus mechanism, and on the rules of the specific 
applicable legal system or systems. However, our baseline position is that there are 
significant potential liability risks for entities involved in a distributed ledger, 
particularly those with design, control and/or maintenance roles. 
 
D. Liability Risks in Major Legal Systems 
Given that private law differs from country to country we will address the three main 
legal families in the world including French civil law based on the Code Civil (which 
extends to many Western European, African and South American countries), 
Common Law (as examples we address the US, the UK and Australia), and 
Germanic civil law which is influential in, besides Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, China, Japan and Turkey. 
We consider liability that may arise in one of four ways, by way of (i) contract, (ii) 
tort, (iii) partnership or joint liability, and (iv) specific legislation. Of course, the 
specifics of each head of liability will be entirely jurisdiction specific, so our analysis 
is general, and intended to do no more than make the point that participants in a 
distributed ledger are highly likely to be potentially subject to liability, one way or 
other, for their conduct. Proponents of DLT often like to pretend that the technology 
is somehow beyond the law, or at least, the law’s reach. But courts will never allow 
such a restriction in their jurisdiction. The courts of sophisticated legal systems are 
jealous of the extent of their jurisdictions and for the very good reason that citizens 
should not be without redress in their nation’s courts.104   
1. Contract 
In contract law each party is liable under the terms of the contract, i.e. for that which 
the contract says they are liable. The parties to the contract are not the computer as 
non-human electronic agent, but the person that exercises control (by virtue of 
ownership, management rights, or otherwise) of the non-human agent; the contractual 
acts – meeting of minds, breach of contract, performance – are attributed to this socio-
technical ensemble.105 In order to establish liability, a contract and a breach of the 
contract are required.  
Without doubt both contract and breach may be established (and have been 
established106) in the relationship between groups 2-4 of our distributed ledger 
                                                 
104 See The Eleftheria [1970], at 94 (per Brandon J); IRB-Brasil Resseguros v Inepar Investments, S.A. 
No. 191 (New York Court of Appeals).  
105 Günther Teubner, Rights of Nun-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as new Actors in Politics 
and Law, 33:4 J. L. & SOC’Y 497 (2006). 
106 Cf. the Bitcoin-denominated Ponzi scheme run by Trendon Shavers, who defrauded investors out of 
more than 700,000 Bitcoins. The respective SEC enforcement action resulted in an order to disgorge 
investments amounting to more than US$40 million and a civil penalty of US$150,000 to be paid by both 
Shavers and the investment vehicle set up by him, see SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 
4652121 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 
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hierarchy, on the one side, and group 5 on the other. For instance, if the Bitcoin 
broker breaches its promise to hold a certain amount of virtual currency on behalf of 
its client the broker will be subject to a contractual claim by its client.107  
Beyond this obvious case contractual relations extend further into the direct 
relationships among group 1 to 4 of our DLT hierarchy, given that both contract and 
breach can be established.  
A contractual agreement requires an offer and acceptance (to establish mutual 
assent), consideration (anything of value exchanged) and an intention to create legal 
relations.108 As to offer, acceptance and mutual assent: In our DLT hierarchy we 
suggest that hierarchy groups 1 and 2 – the core group and validation nodes – are 
parties to the ‘distributed ledger contract’ given that without them the system would 
not work.109 Even if some members of DLT hierarchy groups 1 and 2 do not wish to 
enter into legally binding relations, the fact they participate in the system knowing 
that third parties will rely upon it, may turn their participation in the distributed ledger 
into legally consequential conduct.110 In particular, in the Bitcoin blockchain 
individuals who wish to participate in the ledger join the network – and declare their 
consent to the disclosed modus operandi – by downloading the freely available 
Bitcoin software and thus volunteering their computer to run the Bitcoin ledger 
software. 
Consideration matters in most common law systems. It may be less readily 
identifiable given the uncertain flows of assets in open source and permissionless 
systems, however, any type of consideration will suffice. Consideration can take the 
form of additional virtual assets (as in the case of Bitcoin miners), traffic (for 
advertisement purposes) or fee payments. The fact participants willingly enter into a 
distributed ledger, suggests they perceive value from doing so. And of course in 
civilian legal systems, consideration is not usually a precondition for the existence of 
a contract.111 
                                                 
23090 / Sept. 22 (2014), Securities and Exchange Commission v. Trendon T. Shavers and Bitcoin Savings 
and Trust, Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-416. 
107 Cf. Bayern, supra note 21, at 25-29. 
108 See from the old English case law: Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v. Grant 
4 Ex D 216 (1879) (Thesiger LJ); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company 1 QB 256 (1893) (Bowen 
LJ); on the German civil code: Busche in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 7th ed. 
2015, Vor §145 ¶31; and on the French Code Civil: Case Société Chronopost v. Société Banchereau, N 
° of appeals: 93-18632 (1996), available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007035966 (last visited July 
7, 2017). 
109 Even if we do not consider the validation nodes parties to the DL ‘contract’, their conduct may matter 
if we include them as agents to the core group. 
110 The legal basis for that may vary. In the UK or Australia such conduct could give rise to remedies 
under statutory law, see infra at D.2. In the US, an implied contract is likely to be found to exist, see 
USC, in re Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597, 58 Ct.Cl. 709, 43 S.Ct. 425, 67 
L.Ed. 816 (1923) (holding that “an agreement … is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties 
showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding”).  
111 For instance, s. 311 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch does not require consideration as a precondition 
for a “Schuldverhältnis” (best translated as ‘obligation’). Generally speaking, laws based on the Roman 
contract law don’t insist on consideration as a precondition for obligations. 
31 
 
Second, whether there is a breach of contract depends on conduct in the context of 
the contract’s terms. General principles of contract law apply: Whether a term is a 
condition or a warranty depends on the intentions of the party discerned from the 
contract in light of context. The more important such features are for one party, and 
the more clearly they are expressed prior to entering into the agreement, the greater 
the likelihood that judges will consider them as part of the contract. Warning language 
displayed prior to entering into the contract may constitute terms. Disclaimers and 
liability waivers may further limit obligations if they are upheld in court.112  For 
contractual liability, however, it makes no difference whether the damage resulted 
from the misconduct of a human being or a machine’s malfunction. The owner or 
operator is liable for the machine’s malfunction.113 
Contractual liability results in joint liability where the causes of actions are not 
distinct and the defendants acted in furtherance of a common purpose.114 Generally 
speaking all multiple nodes functioning together to run the ledger (hierarchy group 2), 
and all core developers developing the code together (hierarchy group 1) would meet 
that test on their respective hierarchy level. If nodes and developers cooperate, 
hierarchy groups 1 and 2 may find themselves tied together by joint liability vis-a-vis 
third parties.115  
Some authors suggest no contractual relationship exists in distributed networks 
where the user is unknown and the userbase unstable, where the performance of the 
service depends on who is connected at what time, and none of the individual nodes is 
                                                 
112 General Public License or Open Source Software Licenses (OSSL) used by open source developers, 
including those that distributed the codes of Bitcoin and ETHER, use very broad language to limit 
liability. For instance, the MIT license states “THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT 
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND 
NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE 
LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF 
CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.” It is uncertain, 
however, whether courts will listen to this argument given that not a lot of courts have interpreted and 
applied the provisions of open source licenses. In particular, legislation in some countries provides for 
certain non-excludable warranties where a firm is carrying on a business. For instance, the U.S. Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-314 to § 2-316 provides that certain warranties are implied in the sale of a product 
(as adopted by U.S. states); the Australian Competition And Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 54 
stipulates that there “is a guarantee that the goods are of acceptable quality.” In light of such statutes, the 
exclusion clauses may not be effective in limiting liability for negligence and consequential damages. 
See for the US: ROD DIXON, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LAW 104-105 (2004) (stating that the exclusion 
of liability is void); for Australia: Brian Fitzgerald & Nic Suzor, Legal Issues for the Use of Free and 
Open Source Software in Government, 29:2 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 412, IV (2005) (arguing that the 
GPL liability exclusion will not withstand court scrutiny); for Germany: TILL JAEGER & AXEL METZGER, 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE ¶219, 224, 242, 266 (4th ed., 2016) (arguing that the exclusion of liability used 
in American open source licenses is null and void in certain cases due to violation of German legislation 
on prescribed contract terms; more generous exclusions can be agreed upon in at arms length 
negotiations). 
113 For instance, for French law: PHILIPPE MALAURIE, PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK & LAURENT AYNÈS, 
DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 75 (2016). 
114  For German law, ss. 421 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
115 This does not mean that groups 1 and 2 are liable towards each other, nor that end users necessarily 
have claims against the developers. See on the discussion of waivers, supra note 112. 
32 
 
in itself essential (such as in permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin).116 Proponents 
of the idea that the DLT relationship does not give rise to legal rights refer implicitly 
to participants’ lack of intent to grant contractual rights to co-users.117 However, 
business entities are often unaware of all participants, and their roles, in complex 
business interactions.118 A distributed ledger is a complex network of users and 
contractual relationships that may change from time to time depending on who is 
participating in the ledger operation. While anonymity of the parties renders 
enforcement potentially difficult, it does not mean the actions of individuals who 
together ‘operate’ the distributed ledger are not legally revelant.  
In a distributed ledger, IT-based messages and transactions coincide; any message a 
node sends is a declaration of intent and contribution to the transaction.119 It is 
inconsistent to deny legal relevance of cooperation where only reliance on others 
ensures access to one’s own asset value and where this very cooperation by others is 
the precondition of contributing to the ledger in the first place. A simple example may 
demonstrate our point: assume miners on the Bitcoin blockchain find, for whatever 
reason, that no one will accept (today) the newly and properly generated Bitcoins, or 
(after 21 million Bitcoins are mined) who will accept the recycled split Bitcoins, 
effectively creating a fork between the blockchain leading to this miner and all others. 
The miner who invested significant processing power (i.e. energy) will either turn to 
the Bitcoin nodes that validate honestly mined coins (i.e. all who hold Bitcoins 
directly) for fulfilment of the promise given to them that honestly mined coins would 
be added to the chain and thereby receive value, or to the core developers, for 
damages. In both cases the miner has standing to sue based on the promise received 
by all Bitcoin nodes together, regardless of the fact that the miner did not, at the time, 
                                                 
116 Dulong de Rosnay, supra note 24, sub 2.; Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized 
Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia, 55 (Unpublished manuscript, March 12, 
2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664; Bayern, supra note 21, at 31-33 (arguing that “a 
bitcoin does not represent a transactional or organizational right in the way that shares of stock or a 
partnership interests do” and stating that “given merely my knowledge of a secret key for a certain 
amount of bitcoins, there is nobody associated with Bitcoin against whom I have a claim-right, and 
conversely nobody has a duty to me – apart from the general duty to refrain from interfering with 
intangible personal property. Those running the Bitcoin software are free to ignore my attempts to 
transfer bitcoins to a new bitcoin address. They have no contract with me, implied or otherwise. They 
are free to ignore me, to dispute my ownership of bitcoins on technological grounds, and so on.” 
117 Bayern, supra note 21, at 31-33 (arguing that “a bitcoin does not represent a transactional or 
organizational right in the way that shares of stock or a partnership interests do” and stating that “given 
merely my knowledge of a secret key for a certain amount of bitcoins, there is nobody associated with 
Bitcoin against whom I have a claim-right, and conversely nobody has a duty to me – apart from the 
general duty to refrain from interfering with intangible personal property. Those running the Bitcoin 
software are free to ignore my attempts to transfer bitcoins to a new bitcoin address. They have no 
contract with me, implied or otherwise. They are free to ignore me, to dispute my ownership of bitcoins 
on technological grounds, and so on. … In this sense, a bitcoin is not a right against the other users of 
the Bitcoin network”). 
118 This has prompted Teubner to analyze “Networks as Connected Contracts”: see Teubner, Networks 
as Connected Contracts, supra note 95; see also Günther Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The Hybridization 
of Contracting, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 51 (2007). 
119 This concept is inherent in automatized transactions. See, on smart contracts: Koulu, supra note 92, 
at 61 (“A transaction is a message, a message is a transaction. … By making the transaction, each party 
enters into a contract”) and at 65 (“the declaration of intent is given through a transaction to the contract 
itself”). 
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know the nodes nor the developers. While enforcement may be difficult,120 we must 
not confuse potential for legal liability with the challenge of enforcement.   
Another argument against contractual liability is that node operators may have no way 
of knowing to which use their fragmented contribution to the network is put,121 which 
for instance could include money laundering or terrorist financing. Again, this 
argument is flawed. Nodes could require AML/CFT checks as a precondition for hard 
currency being exchanged into virtual assets – they could define this as a precondition 
for the overall use of the networks. The fact that nodes sign up to the network (i.e. buy 
/ sell / mine Bitcoins) without AML/CFT checks may evidence ignorance of the law 
but not the law’s inapplicability.  
2. Law of Torts / Delict and Special Liability Statutes 
Joint tortfeasors are two or more individuals with joint and several liability in tort for 
the same injury to the same person or property.122 Joint and several liability means the 
plaintiffs can collect any damages award from any one of a group of joint tortfeasors. 
Tort claims are particularly important where there is no contractual liability, in 
particular with regard to DLT hierarchy group 5 suing the other DLT hierarchies, or 
in the case of DLT hierarchy groups 1 and 2 being sued by DLT hierarchy groups 3 
and 4 in the absence of a contract.123 
While the importance of these claims varies across jurisdictions – in many common 
and German-law based civil law jurisdictions the courts are loathe to award damages 
in tort for pure economic loss – the type of loss to which mostrisks will give rise. On 
the one hand tort claims could arise from damages to ‘property’ via the distributed 
ledger. The relevance of property-related claims depends on the legal qualification of 
the plaintiff’s position in the system. For instance, if a Bitcoin is deemed tangible 
property124 intentional interference (i.e. a hack or hard fork resulting in temporary 
                                                 
120 The miner would turn to the nodes it can identify and ask them to pay damages. See Dulong de Rosnay, 
Peer-to-Peer, supra note 24, sub 2. (suggesting collective insurance to mitigate the impact, but going on 
to argue that ‘collective intentionality’ would lack legal personality). 
121 Cf. Dulong de Rosnay, supra note 24, sub 3. (drawing the conclusion that it is questionable whether 
joint commitment or responsibility or contract may be applicable and helpful notions in the quest for 
distributed legal persons, rights or duties); Wright & De Filippi, supra note 114, at 55-56. 
122 See, for instance, ss. 830, 840 of the German Civil Code (BGB); for France, see article 1384(1) Code 
Civile; see also the French case, Agent judiciaire de Trésor public v. S.A.R.L. Clans-Var La Flèche 
d’Azur, Gaz. Pal. 1969. 2. 312 (1969), translated case available at 
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/french/case.php?id=1430 (last visited July 
7, 2017). 
123 See Primavera De Filippi, Ethereum, 100, in Méadel & Musiani, supra note 24 (arguing in favor of 
tort claims against DAO developers); Wright & De Filippi, supra note 114, at 55-56 (arguing in favor of 
the developer’s liability and against the user’s liability since the user did not know, or did not have a 
good reason to believe that the third party could potentially cause harm to someone); Francesca Musiani, 
Cécile Méadel, Alexandre Mallard, Bitcoin, 45-46, in Méadel & Musiani, supra note 24 (considering tort 
claims against Bitcoin code developers, while denying them against miners, nodes and owners of BTC). 
124 Cf. Raskin, supra note 19, at 984-1005 (arguing that Bitcoin is tangible property for the purposes of 
Civil Procedure due to the exclusionary effect of the “owner’s” access key and in favor of allocating 
jurisdiction based on rights in rem). Raskin’s opinion is shared by the US Internal Revenue Service, see 
US Internal Revenue Service, Notice 2014-21 IRS Virtual Currency Guidance (March 25, 2014) 
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_IRB/ar12.html (arguing that virtual currency is property for tax 
purposes). But, see Schroeder, supra note 17, at 14-27 (arguing that Bitcoin is not “money” under the 
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denial of access or even permanent diversion of the Bitcoin owned by the user) could 
result in claims based on trespass to chattels or conversion,125 while the application of 
tort law to Bitcoin as intangible property126 is less certain.127 On the other hand, 
claims could stem from fraud, theft or other types of illicit conduct. Code 
modification could amount to any of the former.128 Whether code modification in fact 
amounts to fraud or other types of actionable harm depends, among others, on the 
users’ intention. In most jurisdictions, intentionally inflicting harm on others results in 
liability for damages.129  
An entity operating in the distributed ledger may be liable in tort if its negligent act, 
omission or misstatement causes loss or damage, including loss due to a security 
breach or a coding error. A record on the system may be inaccurate causing losses to 
those relying on it.130 An entity’s liability in negligence will depend on whether it 
owes a duty of care and has breached that duty, whether the breach caused loss or 
damage, and whether it has effectively contractually excluded liability for this type of 
loss or damage. 
 
The existence of a duty of care depends in part on the type of loss suffered and by 
whom it is suffered. In most potential distributed ledger actions, the relevant loss is 
likely to be ‘pure economic loss’ (that is, economic loss occurring in the absence of, 
or prior to, any damage to property or person). Courts in common law countries (and 
many civil law countries) have been reluctant to find that a duty of care exists in cases 
of pure economic loss for fear of “imposing unreasonable burdens on the freedom of 
individuals to protect or pursue their own legitimate social and business interests 
...”.131 However, one may be liable in negligence for pure economic loss in certain 
                                                 
US Uniform Commercial Code since the Bitcoin owner lacks physical custody). See also Christopher, 
supra note 7, at 179-180 (undecided). 
125 See on the US: The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 and § 218; on Australia: Penfolds Wines Pty 
Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; and on the UK: Torts (Interference With Goods) Act 1977 (UK). 
126 Cf. Bayern, supra note 21, at 29-31 (holding that a Bitcoin is intangible personal property); Schroeder, 
supra note 17, at 23-42 (arguing that Bitcoin is a “general intangible” under the US Uniform Commercial 
Code). 
127 The answer partly depends on whether property doctrine such as trespass to chattel may be expanded 
into the electronic context. The case law and articles are too numerous to be discussed here in detail. For 
an overview from the US perspective, see David M. Fritch, Click Here For Lawsuit – Trespass to 
Chattels in Cyberspace, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 31 (2004); Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of 
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 421 (2002). 
128 But, see Bayern, supra note 21, at 33 note 28. 
129 See for the common law: Bayern, supra note 21, at 33 note 28 (holding that “interference with 
individually owned bitcoins via a technological vulnerability on the owner’s computer system probably 
amounts to conversion”). On German civil law, see ss. 826 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, and s. 
1295(2) of the Austrian General Civil Law Book (granting damages for pure economic loss). See articles 
1382 et 1383 du code civil français. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of 
Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 L.A. L. REV. 1299-1367, 1314 (1988) (“These articles, 
everyone agreed, imposed liability only when the plaintiff established that the defendant's intentional 
(article 1382) or negligent (article 1383) wrongdoing caused the plaintiff's injury”). 
130 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, A Comparative Law Sketch of Pure Economic Loss, 305-6, in 
COMPARATIVE TORT LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Mauro Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok, eds., 2015), 
regarding potential liability for flawed data on which other parties rely. 
131 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 218. See id., at 315 et seq. 
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situations, especially if the plaintiff was a member of a class exposed to foreseeable 
loss by the defendant’s conduct whose members were ascertainable by the defendant 
and if imposing the duty does not unreasonably interfere with the defendant’s 
commercial freedom.132 Some common law countries also have statutory provisions 
that extend the duty of care to apply in cases of pure economic loss. For example, in 
New South Wales in Australia, the Civil Liability Act of 2002 includes ‘economic 
loss’ in the definition of ‘harm’ and a person may be negligent in failing to take 
precautions against a risk of harm if the the risk was foreseeable and not insignificant, 
and a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those 
precautions.133   
 
The relevant operator might establish that no duty of care existed, particularly if the 
plaintiff is a second or third line victim and not part of an ascertainable class. Liability 
for pure economic loss is therefore more likely in the case of smaller, permission-
based blockchains where the class of plaintiffs is readily ascertainable, although the 
plaintiff would still need to prove the entity breached its duty of care (by, for instance, 
not meeting the standard of a reasonable node or software developer) and that this 
breach caused the plaintiff’s loss.134 Operators may contractually exclude liability for 
negligence in these situations. However, such an exclusion clause may be void under 
consumer legislation or subject to narrow construction by the courts. 
Over time, and painfully slowly from the perspective of technical innovation, courts 
in jurisdictions that allow tort claims for pure economic loss will shape the duties of 
care in the DLT context as distributed ledgers gain importance in business over time. 
This could result, for instance, in judicial pronouncements regarding the approporiate 
announcement time and method for code modifications, the required bit size and node 
computing power for the modification, and the necessary diligence prior to the new 
code’s release.135 In a way, the strictest jurisdiction involved may determine the level 
of care for the whole ledger. The important point here is, again, that groups 1 to 4 in 
our DLT hierarchy cannot act as they wish; rather they need to keep the reasonable 
expectations of all parties relying on the respective ledger as well as the evolving case 
law in all jurisdictions where system users and beneficiaries can establish a court’s 
jurisdiction136 in mind, and risk liability if they do not. 
                                                 
132 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 204. 
133 For example, see ss. 5, 5B(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).    
134 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, TEXAS L. REV. 88 (2010). 
135 We do not share the generic view stated by Bayern, supra note 21, at 33 note 28 (arguing that Bitcoin 
owners reasonably intend to take the risk associated with further evolution of the Bitcoin computer 
system). Bitcoin has moved beyond an assembly of anarchic code developers into the commercial sphere. 
To the same extent as this development has amended the economic importance of Bitcoin, ledger 
participants must take into account the reasonable expectations of other participants when developing 
the code further. Material changes in code development, such as increasing the number, or speed, of 
Bitcoins to be mined could violate the developers’ duty of care. 
136 As to jurisdiction, see infra, at III.C.2. and V. 
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3. General Partnership or Joint venture 
The criteria of partnership law as to when a group of joint actors will be a partnership 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While under the laws of some jurisdictions137 
the joint pursuit of a (joint) objective suffices to establish an unincorporated 
company, the law of most common law jurisdictions require for a general partnership 
the sharing of profits. If a cooperation is a partnership it will usually result in joint 
liability.  
For instance, while participation in a clearing and settlement distributed ledger system 
that relies on all nodes’ mutual cooperation for identifying true transactions may be 
deemed a joint pursuit of a shared objective sufficient under some civil laws to 
establish a joint venture,138 the fee and profit sharing agreement will determine 
whether such a blockchain is deemed a partnership under common law. As long as 
profit opportunities are held by a third-party distributed ledger sponsor / organizer and 
the nodes bear their own expenses and are rewarded on predetermined basis as with 
Bitcoin, the risk that the system is a partnership at common law is very low indeed.139 
However, if in a permissioned blockchain the network of validation nodes offers the 
services of the network to third party users which pay ‘the network’ for these services, 
the system may be deemed a partnership; and in turn all validation nodes as partners 
may be liable vis-à-vis third parties.  
While the former shows that there is significant liability risk, the case of the DAO 
illustrates the potential magnitude of the risk. In the DAO, all investors jointly voted 
on investment proposals, all held jointly the assets acquired, no legal entity was 
positioned as a liability shield in between assets and investors, and all investors 
agreed that they were to share the profits generated by the assets. If the DAO’s assets 
had generated losses rather than profits (for instance, people working in a factory held 
by the DAO were harmed by an accident) all investors could be held to be partners 
and personally liable.140  
As a rule of thumb the risk of liability associated with DLT participation based on 
partnership law is the greater:  
                                                 
137 Notably, German law on the Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (“unincorporated company”). In 
particular, it has been held that certain developer associations in the open source domain such as the 
Apache Software Foundation or core developer groups qualify as unincorporated companies if in 
addition to the joint purpose of further developing an open source software there is some, albeit purely 
factual, organizational structure. See Jaeger & Metzger, supra note 113, at ¶193-200. The same applies 
to Blockchain core developer groups surrounding Bitcoin and Ethereum, in particular the Bitcoin 
foundation. 
138 An example could be provided by the Swiss giro network case BGE 121 III 310, 314-15 where the 
Swiss Federal Court has taken the view that for purposes of external liability the network should not be 
regarded as a collection of bilateral contracts but as a multilateral co-operative system similar to an 
unincorporated business organization; the argument rests on the ground that one bank could not meet its 
obligation without the other so co-operation was an implicit condition of the contract. On the common 
law perspective, see Collins, supra note 95, at 64-71 (“Such a radical departure from the ordinary 
principles of contractual responsibility seems unlikely to be imitated in the common law”). 
139 Other features missing in permissionless systems may include the lack of a centralized coordinating 
authority that receives and distributes the residual profits. 
140 This view has been shared by Hinkes, supra note 17. 
37 
 
o the more a server owner benefits from participating in the distributed ledger 
through profits (as long as there are others who benefit in the same way); 
o the greater its influence on the server design, set-up or update, with ‘creators’ 
being more influential than ‘simple users’; and  
o the greater its influence on the decision to let others use or be excluded from 
from using the distributed ledger.  
From the last consideration follows that the function of a validation node in a 
permissioned blockchain with a veto right against access or updates (hereinafter 
called ‘consortium blockchain’) is more likely to lead to personal liability than the 
‘simple’ mining function in Bitcoin. The result of the former may well be not only 
mutualization of data processing but also mutualization of liabilities and risks. 
4. Specific Legislation, in particular CompetitionLaw 
Regulators have suggested that DLT can pose a risk to fair competition and orderly 
markets. For example:  
ESMA anticipates … [e]arly [DLT] participants might refuse or impose 
conditions on new members that make it unduly difficult or costly for 
them to join the DLT network. … Also, it may become increasingly 
difficult to develop competing systems through time for cost or technical 
reasons, e.g., patents that would protect certain components of the 
technology or the need to ensure interoperability with existing systems. 
This could drive some firms out of the market and lead to a monopoly-like 
situation with negative consequences on the cost and quality of the 
services.141  
If DLT functions as a technological barrier that enables or facilitates monopolies 
additional liability may stem from competition / antitrust law. This is of great 
importance since competition laws often impose antitrust liability on different criteria 
from contract or tort law. For instance, under European competition law the definition 
of the responsible party may include the parent and subsidiary companies.142  
While beyond the scope of this paper, market participants involved in a distributed 
ledger system must keep this and other conduct-related legislation (such as data 
                                                 
141 See ESMA, supra note 2, at 11, ¶37. 
142 See Articles 101, 102 and 106 of TFEU in the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT (last accessed July 7, 2017); W. P. 
Wils, The Undertaking as Subject of E.C. Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to 
Natural or Legal Persons, EUR. L. REV 25, 99-116, 100 (2000); see also Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, 
Single Entity Tests in US Antitrust and EU Competition Law (Working Paper, June 21, 2011), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1889232, on the EU-US differences. However, DLT may also contribute to 
competition law compliance efficacy, see Ajinkya Mahesh Tulpule, Enforcement and Compliance in a 
Blockchain(ed) World, 1 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 45 (2017). 
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protection,143 copyright laws,144 consumer protection laws,145 tax laws,146 
AML/CFT,147 landlord-tenant laws148 etc.) in mind.  
5. ‘Code-as-law’ Defence 
Defendants in a lawsuit may raise the ‘code-as-law’ defence. The argument (raised for 
instance by the hacker that captured the DAO’s Ether149) is if code defines what is 
‘law’, anything possible under the coded design is ‘legal’.  
From a lawyer’s perspective the argument is weak. If someone writes code under 
which the person is entitled to steal others’ money, the code will not legitimize theft. 
The power to make uniform rules is vested with the formal law making bodies of the 
specific legal / governmental system: code is not law.  
However, the original, unamended software design or a new software design that was 
the result of the agreed governance process150 may be considered in a contractual 
claim as a characteristic of the service or product. This is because contractual partners 
– in our DLT hierarchy groups 1 to 4 – have voluntarily chosen to use the code-based 
services and product as they are. For instance, in a proof-of-work consensus model 
the fact that consensus building takes up to 15 minutes is inherent to the model and 
not a breach of contract.  
As a general matter third parties – in our hierachy group 5 – may or may not have 
accepted this DLT characteristic. If for instance a third party has standing under tort 
law, it may be able to recover for an unduly long closing time for a DLT-based 
transaction.  
IV. Impact on Blockchain Participants 
Given that there is liability risk to entities involved in or in contact with a DLT 
system, participants as well as regulators are well advised to take legal as well as 
technical precautions. What might these measures look like? 
                                                 
143 Cf. Gabison, supra note 51, at 330-335; Matthias Berberich & Malgorzata Steiner, Blockchain 
Technology and the GDPR - How to Reconcile Privacy and Distributed Ledgers?, 2 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 422 (2016). 
144 Cf. Gabison, supra note 51, at 335-339. 
145 See, on smart contracts, Koulu, supra note 92, at 67. 
146 Supra note 20. 
147 Supra note 19. 
148 Cf. Christopher, supra note 7, at 155 (arguing that access to an apartment governed by a blockchain 
may violate landlord-tenant laws if the blockchain inhibits the tenant’s access following the tenant’s 
default). 
149 See Lester Coleman, DAO Ether Hacker Warns Against Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (June 18, 
2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/dao-ether-hacker-warns-hard-fork/ (last visited July 7, 2017). 
150 For this reason, the DAO’s hacker’s argument was flawed in two ways: First, code is not law; property, 
criminal and other law apply. Second, under the DAO’s governance arrangement, financial transactions 
were to be agreed on by all investors rather than one user (the hacker) alone. 
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A. Participation as Operational Risk Contingent Liability 
Centralized ledgers not only centralize processes, but also liability.  
Formerly, when looking at central counterparties market participants did not only pay 
for processing, but also for the risk cushion provided by one highly regulated and very 
solvent entity. Blockchain has the potential to mutualize control over these entities. 
However, under legal principles all over the world, joint control is likely to come 
along with joint liability.  
In light of the issues raised in previous sections, it would be inappropriate to treat 
potential liability risk as non-existent. In a non-technical sense, participation brings 
about a contingent liability which needs to be considered as part of the IT-based 
operational risk.  
B. Provisioning against Risk: Capital Requirements and/or Insurance 
The Basel 3 capital adequacy rules while recognizing information systems and IT 
importance treat such risks as but one type of operational risk.151 Under the Basel 3 
Principles for Sound Management of Operational Risk:  
[m]anagement should ensure the bank has a sound technology 
infrastructure that meets current and long-term business requirements by 
providing sufficient capacity for normal activity levels as well as peaks 
during periods of market stress; ensuring data and system integrity, 
security, and availability; and supporting integrated and comprehensive 
risk management. … Management should make appropriate capital 
investment or otherwise provide for a robust infrastructure at all times, 
particularly before … new products are introduced.152  
The Risk Management Principles lack further details.  
Under the Basel 3 standard approach banks must hold capital against operational risk 
based on the income generated in the last reference period.153 Under the advanced 
measurement approach (AMA), intermediaries must collect, in a loss database, for 
each incident: (1) the date of the loss event; (2) the date of its discovery; (3) the loss 
that was related to it; and (4) whether that loss was (fully or partially) recovered from 
insurance154; and calculate the operational risk charge based on the historic data.  
                                                 
151 See Vlasta Svatá & Martin Fleischmann, IS/IT Risk Management in Banking Industry, 2011 ACTA 
OECONOMICA PRAGENSIA 3, 42-60 (2011) (stating that current treatment of IS/IT-based risk is 
inadequate). To this day, the Basel risk management website has not devoted a special workflow to IS/IT 
risk, see Basel Committee – Risk Management, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_50/index.htm (last visited July 23, 2017). 
152 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SOUND MANAGEMENT OF 
OPERATIONAL RISK (June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs195.pdf. 
153 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, STANDARDISED MEASUREMENT APPROACH FOR 
OPERATIONAL RISK (March 2016), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.pdf. 
154 Notably, the risk framework dating back to Basel 2 (prior to the GFC) does not mention IS/IT risk as 
separate event types, but looks at the results, including business disruption and failed execution. See 
appendix 9 of Basel II. 
40 
 
The Basel operational risk management framework is under revision; and under that 
revision a clear link of operational risk management to a bank’s technological 
processes is required.155 Given the expected large loss impact and frequency of 
events, and the intermediary’s collection of all risk-related events in few global 
databases,156 recognition of DLT risk and a predetermined risk budget similar to that 
for participation in a syndicate or other types of joint ventures could well be the 
outcome. 
Related concerns arise particularly in the context of systems which could be classified 
as financial infrastructure. Financial infrastructure attracts separate and additional 
requirements under guidelines from IOSCO and the Committee on Payment and 
Market Infrastructures (CPMI) of the Bank for Internatioanl Settlements (BIS).157 The 
CPMI principles contain detailed requirements in terms of capital, risk management 
etc which would clearly apply in the context of DLT-based payment and securities 
settlement systems. 
Even in the absence of capital adequacy rules, given that losses from DLT 
participation can be serious enough and sufficiently likely to be considered by top 
management, a financial intermediary’s management could be required to establish a 
DLT-related risk budget, enter into insurance, or limit DLT participation to very large 
and establish counterparties. Be this as it may, DL participation does not come for 
free and requires consideration of each function in the DLT hierarchy and whether it 
adds to, or reduces, liability risk. 
C. Distributed Ledger – Concentrated Ownership? 
Liability matters little for a private party (an individual) with few assets who is 
therefore unlikely to become the target of a law suit (with anarchic code developers 
being an eminent example). Legal uncertainty, ambiguity and lack of assets can 
function as a liability shield for individuals as the reward will not justify the costs of 
enforcement. The perspective of a globally operating financial or production 
conglomerate is different: those entities are likely targets of lawsuits, regardless of the 
little legal certainty provided by legislation and case law. This could lead to risk 
multiplication given that someone may test the waters, and thereby influence the set-
up of any distributed ledger, and potentially limit the use cases of DLT. Given the 
international dimension the legal assessments necessary to provide a full view of 
liability risk includes the laws of multiple jurisdictions. This is particularly true of a 
permissionless blockchain. All of this together turns the drafting of access terms, and 
decisions while part of the system, into complex and costly endeavours.  
Both liability exposure and transaction costs for its assessment have implications for 
the ideal legal set-up of a DLT  structure. As such, we may observe that the ideal 
                                                 
155 See Bank for International Settlements, Standardised Measurement Approach for Operational Risk 
(Consultative document, March 9, 2016), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.htm. 
156 Marco Folpmers, Basel’s New Approach to Operational Risk: A Step Backwards, GARP (April 22, 
2016), http://www.garp.org/#!/risk-intelligence/all/all/a1Z40000003CA7oEAG/basels-new-approach-
operational-risk (last visited July 10, 2017) (“Since banks struggle with the collection of sufficient loss 
data, consortia (such as ORX) have arisen in which banks pool operational loss data”).  
157 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 
2015), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/info_pfmi.htm?m=3%7C16%7C598 (last visited July 23, 2017). 
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setting could – ironically – take the form of a concentrated legal structure in a 
distributed ledger system.  
Concentration may be achieved by two means. First, participation in the distributed 
ledger may be limited to controlled entities of a conglomerate. If, for instance, a large 
multinational bank, tech enterprise or financial market infrastructure operator and its 
subsidiaries set up a system the desirable tech characteristic of additional trust may be 
achieved while liability risk is low. Second, multiple parties jointly interested in one 
service could leave the set-up and operation of the system to one global enterprise 
sufficiently large and capitalized to bear liability risk and acquire those services on a 
fee basis,158 or set up and capitalize such an entity as a joint venture themselves. In 
this case their role could be that of simple users, related service providers or in some 
cases independent third parties (cf. DLT hierarchy groups 3-5). Be this as it may – 
liability is a factor in structuring distributed ledger transactions that needs to be 
considered in the existing legal and regulatory framework and which may well lead to 
concentrated ownership in distributed ledgers. 
V. Law as a Factor in DLT Structuring 
The claim that risk vanishes simply due to the use of a blockchain is, from a legal 
perspective, ridiculous.  
Our analysis of the laws of the most important legal systems has revealed four general 
principles as to liability. First, the more the ledger is organized or based on a 
predetermined governance structure (most evident in permissioned ledgers), the 
greater the risk that participants, in particular those participants that are influential and 
‘control’ the ledger, will be held liable for breach of contract or as partners of the 
‘ledger partnership’.  
Second, cooperation of sophisticated financial and business services requires 
organization and, if the resource dealt with by the ledger is essential, investors will 
demand control rights in return for their investment. Common sense and economic 
need will push for permissioned ledgers, so liability will be a major factor.  Large 
scale economic use of the ledger will come with potential liability.  
Third, permissionless ledgers are not the answer to the liability issue. Even in 
unpermissioned ledgers (for instance Bitcoin), the liability risk is not zero, but rather 
highly case specific. There is a strong differentiation of treatment among countries 
and low levels of legal certainty; and thus higher legal costs and risk premia, 
especially for transnational permissionless systems.  
Fourth, our thesis that liability matters in the establishment of distributed ledgers 
holds nothwithstanding that the legal basis for liability will vary across jurisdictions. 
Some liability will arise from contract or liability statutes, some from special 
legislation, and some from tort or partnership law, but the net result of the joint / 
coordinated activity will most often be joint liability. From the perspective of globally 
active financial institutions and multinational enterprises that liability can result in 
different ways legallymakes it far more difficult to enter into distributed ledgers 
                                                 
158 This seems to be the business model of IBM. Please note that an actor’s liability risk is not affected 
by outsourcing. Hence, if the DL set-up and operation is deemed an outsourcing, liability will remain. 
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across countries and with other firms. The risk of entangling one's own balance 
sheet with other ledger parties’ obligations is a serious barrier to cross-firm ledgers. 
Firms will try to mitigate these risks with choice of law and jurisdiction clauses, but 
this approach will be less effective with statutory, tortious and partnership liability 
and with services offered to consumers (given the mandatory jurisdiction and 
applicable law typically associated with consumer transactions). Parties will choose 
the governing law to minimize liability, but liability risk may well harm, in particular, 
the development of cross-border ledger systems with many nodes.  
The risk of distributed liability of distributed ledgers suggests that concentrated 
ownership is the most likely way of legally structuring distributed ledgers. Distributed 
ownership may be conditioned on a higher degree of legal certainty and a greater 
degree of harmonization across countries. Harmonization of private law consequences 
of DLT systems could be most useful, although of course this will be a long-term 
undertaking.159 In addition, international regulatory cooperation in development of 
minimum regulatory standards will be key to addressing potential risks, and this 
begins with the technical harmonization presently underway.160 
From a legal and regulatory perspective, the starting point must be to focus on the 
sorts of issues that will arise when any of the core attributes which make DLT 
systems attractive - namely their security, immutability and transparency - fail, as fail 
they will. While DLT systems may be very secure from a technological perspective, 
from a legal perspective they may well spread risk that was formerly concentrated in 
very few parties (or perhaps one party), across all system participants (nodes). With 
the realization that the failure of a distributed ledger system represents a risk, financial 
institutions will have to adjust their business strategies to accommodate the contingent 
liability involved in DLT. From the standpoint of immutability, once an error is 
embedded in the blockchain, this may be highly problematic, legally, in that often law 
requires the ability to rectify errors as a matter of law in a way foreign to DLT.161 
Instead of rectification, plaintiffs may turn to compensation. Likewise, transparency 
requires careful consideration in design to avoid liability for inadequate data 
protection. 
As a result, DLT will have different impacts than many expect. In particular, liability 
will not be eliminated, but may instead be spread across the system, and financial 
intermediaries involved in a distributed ledger should arguably hold capital or acquire 
insurance for contingent liabilities stemming from DLT participation. Likewise, 
operators may, in time, need to be governed by regulatory requirements similar to 
those governing other providers of potentially systemically important infrastructure, 
such as traditional centralized payment and settlement systems. 
                                                 
159 See Paech, supra note 17, at 32-37 (examining options available under private international law to 
allocate blockchain arrangements across jurisdictions). 
160 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has established a new technical committee 
to work on the harmonization of standards for blockchain and DLT, with Australia as the chair, see 
ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html. 
 
161 See Paech, supra note 17, at 23-24. 
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Part of the thrill of blockchain to date has been its disregard of the law. With law in 
the picture, data are less attractively housed in distributed ledgers. This does not mean 
liability will exist in all cases. However liability matters, and distributed ledgers may, 
in time, most often be legally structured (particularly in permissioned systems) as a 
joint venture where all servers are owned and operated – ironically – by one entity, or 
a small number of specified entities, rather than as a cooperation among multiple 
entities. 
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